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Abstrakt
Diplomová práce „Vnitřní bezpečnost USA: Realita či mýtus? Domácí boj s terorismem 
po 11. září 2001“ zkoumá změnu v domácí protiteroristické politice USA po 
teroristických útocích z 11. září 2001. Konkrétněji se práce zaměřuje na reorganizaci 
americké vlády, která vedla k vytvoření Ministerstva pro vnitřní bezpečnost. Hlavním 
cílem agendy vnitřní bezpečnosti bylo sjednocení amerických snah soustředěných na 
předcházení a zabránění teroristickým útokům na Spojené státy, snížení americké 
zranitelnost vůči terorismu a minimalizace škod a zajištění obnovy, pokud tyto útoky 
nastanou. Tato diplomová práce se snaží zodpovědět dvě související otázky: (1.) zda 
navržená agenda vnitřní bezpečnosti vedla k vytvoření efektivní a sjednocené politiky 
domácího boje s terorismem založené na sdílení informací, a za (2.) proč, i přes to že 
teroristické útoky z 11. září vytvořily jedinečnou příležitost pro zásadní reorganizaci 
americké vlády a vytvoření jednotné agendy vnitřní bezpečnosti, tato sjedocující agenda 
pod hlavičkou Ministerstva pro vnitřní bezpečnost nebyla naplněna. Z představené 
analýzy vyplývá, že efektivní reorganizaci americké vlády bylo zabráněno ze tří 
hlavních důvodů. Prvním je vlastní organizační povaha jednotlivých vládních institucí. 
Druhým důvodem je „racionální jednání“ hlavvních aktérů amerického vládního 
systému (jak prezidenta USA, tak Kongresu). Za třetí, sdílení informací, jako jeden 
z hlavních elementů americké protiterotisrické politiky, bylo omezeno demokratickými 
principy americké tradice důrazu na osobní svobody.
Abstract
Diploma thesis “U.S. Homeland Security: Reality or Myth? Domestic Counterterrorism 
post-9/11” examines the change in U.S. domestic counterterrorism policy after the 
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terrorist attacks of 9/11. More specifically, it focuses on the U.S. government’s 
reorganization, which led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. As 
outlined in this thesis, the homeland security agenda was aimed at unifying the U.S. 
efforts to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing America’s 
vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing the damage and recovering from attacks that 
do occur. This thesis sets out to answer two interconnected questions: (1) whether the 
proposed homeland security agenda led to an efficient and unified system of U.S. 
domestic counterterrorism measures based on enhanced information sharing; and (2) 
why, in spite of the unique opportunity created by the 9/11 attacks, a comprehensive 
reorganization of the U.S. government to create a coherent homeland security agenda 
did not materialize. Throughout this thesis, it is argued that an efficient U.S. 
government reorganization was obstructed by three main factors. First, the change was 
obstructed by the organizational nature of the government agencies. Second, the 
reorganization was hindered by the “rational choices” of the U.S. leadership (both the 
president and the legislators). Third, the information sharing aspect of the new 
homeland security agenda was strongly shaped by democratic principles and the core 
beliefs of U.S. citizens regarding civil liberties.
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Vnitřní bezpečnost, boj s terorismem, sdílení informací, zpravodajské služby, 
organizační teorie
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Introduction
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) changed the equilibrium of 
U.S. perception towards terrorist threats. This form of violence was not new in 
American historical experience. The threat and use of psychological and physical force 
by individuals, sub-national groups, and state actors aimed at attaining political, social 
and economic objectives in violation of domestic and international law have challenged 
the United States prior to September 11, 2001. However, this unprecedented (in its 
extent and brutality) action against ordinary citizens of the United States carried out on 
American soil, underscored the vulnerability and unpreparedness of the country for such 
an attack. Most importantly, it highlighted two key weaknesses in U.S. operational 
capabilities to counter terrorism. First, the executive branch lacked an effective planning 
mechanism for counterterrorism operations on the domestic level. Second, the U.S. 
intelligence community found it difficult to operate in an integrated manner because its 
structure was a Cold War relic with no single actor having ultimate authority. These two 
interconnected issues led to hampering the information sharing aspect of national 
security, which is essential for successful prevention of the terrorist attacks.
During the Cold War, threats to U.S. national security were essentially coming 
from one single enemy – the Soviet Union and its satellites. Transnational threats were 
not new for U.S. national security officials, but they were treated as marginal within the 
Cold War context. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the growing importance of 
transnational threats, led by terrorism, were recognized both by national security and 
intelligence officials as well as the decision makers. However, the transition from
focusing on one single target essentially bounded by borders and hierarchical in 
structure to targets that are asymmetric and, by definition, transnational, was not 
realized in a swift enough fashion in order to prevent the attacks from happening.
Moreover, given the U.S. historical experience and its relative geopolitical 
isolation, U.S. national security only solemnly had to deal with direct threats to the U.S. 
homeland. That changed on September 11, 2001, when the terrorist attacks ushered in a 
new concept of protecting the homeland. From this moment, homeland security would 
gain a prominent position in U.S. national security strategy. Counterterrorism, both on 
domestic and foreign policy level, became the cornerstone of U.S. national security 
strategy. On the domestic level, the focus was almost immediately shifted to protecting 
the homeland from future terrorist attacks by creating a unified domestic 
counterterrorism strategy securing the U.S. borders and denying terrorists future 
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opportunities to strike at the American soil. In this regard, information sharing was 
made one of the core priorities of the new homeland security strategy.
The first steps taken in creating a unified policy and strategy of U.S. homeland 
security were undertaken less than one month after the attacks first with the creation of 
the Office of Homeland Security, and later with the legislation that created the new 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) by combining twenty-two government 
agencies with approximately 180,000 employees. The Department’s envisaged key role 
was to function as the unifying core of the vast national network and institutions 
involved in homeland security and one of its main tasks was to develop complementary 
systems that avoid duplication and promote collaboration and cooperation. One of the 
DHS’s four directorates, the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
Directorate (IAIP) was intended to fulfill one of the most critical homeland security 
functions – to improve the intelligence sharing and dissemination of information. 
Thus, shortly after 9/11 it seemed that the catastrophic events provided a 
momentum for a governmental change that would enable the U.S. government to 
properly adapt to the post-Cold War security environment and which would ultimately 
improved information sharing on all of its levels.
Research Objectives
The purpose of this thesis is to answer two interconnected questions. The first 
question is whether the proposed introduction of homeland security agenda led to an 
efficient and unified system of U.S. domestic counterterrorism measures based on 
enhanced information sharing. Throughout this research, efficiency is understood as 
measures undertaken on organizational level within the U.S. government in order to 
counter future terrorist attacks on the U.S. soil. These measures include the 
organizational change leading to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security 
as well as processes connected with the U.S. intelligence community reform in order to 
enhance information sharing. Unification is then defined based on the National Strategy 
for Homeland Security’s vision of the DHS as a unifying core of the vast national 
networks and institutions involved in homeland security, ensuring the avoidance of 
duplication.1
                                               
1 National Strategy for Homeland Security. 2002. Washington, D.C.: White House, Office of Homeland 
Security, p.3. Available at: < http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_hls.pdf > [accessed 22. 4. 
2011].
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Although it is possible to say that there has not been any successful terrorist 
attack of 9/11 scope on targets within the United States after 9/112, if we evaluate the 
actual steps undertaken in order to achieve the unification of policies responsible for 
prevention of such events, it is possible to see that throughout both presidencies of 
George W. Bush the system was far from unified and efficient. This conclusion then 
leads to the second question addressed throughout this thesis, which explores why, in 
spite of the unique opportunity created by the 9/11 attacks, a comprehensive 
reorganization of the U.S. government in order to create a coherent homeland security 
agenda did not materialize. 
In this thesis it is hypothesized that an efficient U.S. government reorganization
was obstructed by three main factors. First, the change was obstructed by the nature of 
the government agencies themselves. Second, the reorganization was hindered by the 
rational choices of the U.S. leadership (both the president and the legislators). Third, the 
new homeland security agenda was strongly shaped by American citizens’ democratic 
principles and their core beliefs regarding civil liberties. However, among these three 
obstacles to the successful government reorganization, the institutional aspect is perhaps 
the most important as institutions are the means by which public preferences are 
transformed into concrete policies. In other words, organization matters.3 Organizational 
structure, culture and management all influence how efficient the system will be. 
Furthermore, in order to keep this thesis within a reasonable range, most attention will 
be paid to the organizational obstacles to the creation of unified homeland security 
agenda.
As will be explained in the next chapter, the term homeland security is very 
broad and incorporates many different aspects. Thus, it is important to bear in mind that 
for the purposes of this thesis, the topic of homeland security has been narrowed down 
to the analysis of homeland security in terms of preventing terrorist attacks within the 
United States, i.e. excluding the aspect of protection from and emergency response to 
natural disasters. Moreover, the research is focused on the main deficiency of the pre-
                                               
2 There are opinions suggesting that there in fact was a number of terrorist attacks on American targets 
since 9/11, such as the Virginia snipers case (see e.g. Gruen, Madeleine, Hyland Frank. 2008. “No Attack 
in the U.S. since 9/11? available at:< 
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2008/08/no_attack_in_the_us_since_911.php> [accessed 22.4. 2011]), 
however compared to the scope of successful Al Qaeda attacks during the 1990s such as the 1996 Khobar 
Towers bombing and the 1998 Kenya and Tanzania U.S. embassy attacks and the 9/11, the post-9/11 
incidents are not of an equal importance.
3 For the purpose of this thesis, terms organization and institution and their derivatives are treated as 
equal.
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9/11 domestic counterterrorism efforts and its elimination within the homeland security 
agenda – lack of information sharing.
Roadmap of Research
The argument presented in this diploma thesis will be structured as follows. 
Chapter 1 will provide the theoretical and methodological background for this research 
thesis. This work will commence with a definition of homeland security and a brief 
discussion of its role within national security. Thereafter, different theoretical 
approaches to the study of homeland security will be introduced. Lastly, the Eastonian 
input/output methodology employed in this research study will be presented.
Chapter 2 will focus on the homeland security before 9/11. It will examine the 
evolution of U.S. counterterrorism strategy and the changing perceptions of possible 
threats to the U.S. homeland during and after the Cold War. It will also analyze the 
attempts of the U.S. intelligence community to respond to the changed security 
environment in order to improve coordination and information sharing. 
Chapter 3 will be devoted to the aftermath of 9/11 and the U.S. government’s 
immediate reaction to the attacks. Shortly after the terrorist attacks President Bush and 
the U.S. Congress promoted two initiatives focused on improving the U.S.’s domestic 
counterterrorism strategy. The first was the enactment of the USA Patriot Act, and the 
second was the proposition of a comprehensive homeland security agenda.
Chapter 4 will delve into the legislative, executive and organizational processes 
connected with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. It will also 
evaluate the DHS’s role in information sharing and intelligence coordination.
Chapter 5 will analyze the various aspects of U.S. intelligence community 
reform undertaken in order to enhance information sharing. It will delve into the 
implementation of the 9/11 Commission recommendations through the adoption of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). Then, the implementation 
of the IRTPA provisions will be evaluated based on an analysis of the newly created 
institutions and their role in the intelligence community structure, and also of the old 
institutions and their attempts for internal change.
Chapter 6 will provide analysis of the major shortcomings of the homeland 
security and information sharing agenda. It will also evaluate the concept of unified 
homeland security agenda with regards to the transition of the Bush and Obama 
presidencies.
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The research presented in this diploma thesis partially draws on previous study 
undertaken by the author on organization theory and U.S. intelligence community. 
However, this thesis takes a different approach, applying the organization theory 
research to the more general topic of U.S. homeland security and information sharing.4
                                               
4 Bernardyová, Alžběta. 2010. The U.S. Intelligence Community Reform post-9/11: Strengthening the 
U.S.’s Ability to Fight Terrorism? Praha: Univerzita Karlova v Praze, Fakulta sociálních věd, Institut 
politologických studií.
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1. Analyzing Homeland Security: An Emerging Academic Field
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a vast number of scholars began to focus 
their work on various aspects of homeland security. The scope of their research 
stretches across the gamut from the root causes of this violent act, to appropriate 
government policies for confronting this kind of danger, to analyzing the danger posed 
by natural disasters, along with the more practical recommendations of professional 
responders. This wide range of academic topics originates in the numerous potential 
definitions of homeland security, or more specifically, the very broad and ever 
expanding notion of what should be encompassed as “homeland security.” Thus, it is 
essential to develop from the outset an explicit working definition of what is meant by 
the term “homeland security,” what are its different aspects, and what is its relationship 
to national security and intelligence. These issues will be dealt with in the first section 
of this chapter.
In the second section, different academic approaches to the study of homeland 
security will be introduced. These various approaches may be interpreted as different 
facets of the study of homeland security. They span from topics such as relationship of 
homeland security and terrorism, public policy administration, emergency management 
and critical infrastructure protection to natural disaster preparedness or immigration and 
borders protection. Many of the approaches are also focused more on education of 
homeland security professionals rather than on theory based analysis. Given the vast 
number of literature focusing on homeland security topics, it is quite surprising that the 
question of homeland security as a unified agenda has not been discussed in great depth 
within the political science or organization theory discourses.
For this reason, there is not a “ready-made” theory available, which could be 
applied to the creation of U.S. homeland security agenda post-9/11. Thus, in order to 
explain the resistance of the U.S. government agencies to reform into a unified and 
efficient system, a combined approach of organization and bureaucracy theory with 
aspects from political science and decision-making will be developed. Lastly, this 
chapter will present the research method used in this thesis.
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1.1. Defining Homeland Security and Its Relationship with National 
Security
As Christopher Bellavita, a leading expert in homeland security studies, 
contends there “is no explicit agreement about the definition of homeland security”5. 
Bellavita offers a number of different approaches to homeland security, based on 
assertions about what homeland security emphasizes. His main distinction is between 
the definition set forth by the National Strategy for Homeland Security and other 
definitions based on a broader perception of the term.
The definition of homeland security in the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security is following:
Homeland security is a concentrated national effort to prevent terrorist 
attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to 
terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do 
occur. 6
According to this definition, the core of homeland security is about preventing 
terrorism and responding in a proper manner in case such attacks do occur. However, 
with the perception of the level of terrorist threats diminishing, due to the fact that no 
other terrorist attack of 9/11 scope has been purported since, and simultaneous 
heightening of the perceived need to focus on other primarily natural disaster threats, 
mainly fomented by the tragic aftermath of hurricane Katrina, there has been a shift to a 
more “all-hazard” encompassing definition. This broadened approach to homeland 
security stems also from the practical difficulties of agencies newly responsible for 
homeland security (i.e. domestic counterterrorist) tasks having previous responsibilities 
responding to other emergencies on top of addressing the terrorist threats. As Sauter and 
Carafano put it, “[t]he U.S. government defines homeland security as the domestic 
effort … to defend America from terrorists. In practice homeland security efforts have 
also come to comprise general preparedness under the all-hazards doctrine.”7
From an empirical point of view, it is possible to argue that the occurrence of 
natural or human-caused disasters is much more frequent than terrorist attacks. In this 
sense, the definition of homeland security can be formulated in a following way:
                                               
5 Bellavita, Christopher. 2008. “Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland Security”. Homeland 
Security Affairs 4 (2): 1.
6 National Strategy for Homeland Security. 2002. 
7 Sauter, Mark A., Carafano, James Jay. 2005. Homeland Security: A Complete Guide to Understanding, 
Preventing, and Surveying Terrorism. New York: McGraw Hill, p. xiv.
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Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent and disrupt 
terrorist attacks, protect against man-made and natural hazards, and 
respond and recover from incidents that do occur.8
This approach has been somewhat acknowledged in the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, which recognizes that “effective preparation for catastrophic 
natural disasters and man-made disasters, while not homeland security per se, can 
nevertheless increase the security of the homeland”.9
Another way of looking at the definition of homeland security, according to 
Bellavita, can be as something that is largely an activity of the federal government. Or 
in other words:
Homeland security is what the Department of Homeland Security –
supported by other federal agencies – does to prevent, respond to and 
recover from terrorist and catastrophic events that affect the security of 
the United States.10
Kiki Caruson and Susan MacMancus point out that this definition expresses how 
most state and local officials involved in homeland security perceive homeland security. 
They argument that “[w]hile the federal  government has dominated the making of 
homeland security, local and state governments have been made responsible for putting 
it in place at the grassroots level via mandates from the above.”11
Many scholars also define homeland security through its relationship to national 
security and defense. As with the term homeland security, the term homeland defense 
encompasses many meanings and many times the terms are used interchangeably. David 
Goldfisher stresses that “it was not until after 9/11 that both terms entered mainstream 
policy discourse.”12 Noftsinger et al. add that the term homeland defense in the meaning 
of protection of what lies within borders and traditionally a niche of homeland defense, 
was as a concept quickly altered by the 9/11 attacks. “It became clear that the use of 
traditional law enforcement, coupled with military operations, could not provide 
adequate protection in this new age of terrorism. With the movement toward formal 
                                               
8 Bellavita, C. 2008, p. 4.
9 National Strategy for Homeland Security. 2002, p. 3.
10 Bellavita, C. 2008, p. 5.
11 Caruson, Kiki, MacMancus Susan. 2005. “Homeland Security Preparedness: Federal and State 
Mandates and Local Government.” Perspectives: Homeland Security, Summer 2005: 25.
12 Goldfisher, David. 2008. “Assured Vulnerability: Homeland Security and the Cold War Legacy of 
Defenselessness”. P. 36 in Paul R. Viotti, Michael A. Opheim, Nicholas Bowen (eds.). Terrorism and 
Homeland Security: Thinking Strategically about Policy. Boca Raton: CRC Press Taylor & Francis 
Group.
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bureaucratic organization of these efforts came a new term that encompassed a new 
mission: homeland security.”13 Stockton and Roberts suggest that the distinction 
between homeland security (protecting against internal threats) and homeland defense 
(protecting against external threats) is merely a distinction between the Departments of 
Homeland Security and Defense.14
With regards to national security, Christopher Bellavita than offers a 
comprehensive definition encompassing both homeland security and defense:
Homeland security is an element of national security that works with the 
other instruments of national power to protect the sovereignty, territory, 
domestic population and critical infrastructure of the United States 
against threats and aggression.15
Bellavita also argues that among the main reasons for this differentiation 
between homeland security and national security are attempts to avoid (a.) jurisdictional 
confusion, and (b.) “pressure to share some of the Department of Defense budget (an 
estimated 500 billion dollars in 2008) with the Department of Homeland Defense 
(whose 2008 budget was less than one-tenth the DOD budget).”16
All the above mentioned definitions resonate in Donald F. Kettl’s perception of 
homeland security as, in essence, coordination. As he puts it, homeland security is 
mainly about “weaving together far more effectively the nation’s existing experts and 
resources. It is a mater of doing some new things, many old things much better and 
some old things differently.”17 Yet, Kettl also stresses that “with the rise of homeland 
security as a concern, none of the old policy imperatives evaporated. New ones have 
only been added.”18
For the purposes of this thesis, the first definition of homeland security is the 
most suitable as it allows for a narrower approach to the topic by concentrating on the 
actions and policies connected with counterterrorism efforts. Moreover, this thesis will 
deal in a great detail with the aspect of homeland security connected with information 
and intelligence sharing and the steps undertaken in order to improve them after 9/11. 
                                               
13 Noftsinger, John B., Newbold, Kenneth F., Wheeler, Jack K. 2007. Understanding Homeland Security: 
Politics, Perspectives and Paradoxes. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 29.  
14 Stockton, Paul N., Roberts, Patrick S. 2008. “Findings from the Forum on ‘Homeland Security after the 
Bush Administration: Next Steps to in Building Unity of Effort”. Homeland Security Affairs 4(2): 11.
15 Bellavita, C. 2008, p. 11.
16 Ibid., p. 12.
17 Kettl, Donald F. 2007. System under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics. Washington, 
D.C.: CQ Press, p. 32.
18 Ibid.
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The National Strategy for Homeland Security clearly indicated the importance of 
intelligence sharing in order to avoid being surprised by another terrorist attack. It also 
recognized that agencies of the U.S. government have not always fully shared 
information due to legal or cultural barriers and limitations of information systems and 
emphasized that the U.S. intelligence community under the coordination of the 
Department of Homeland Security must do a better job identifying, collecting, and 
analyzing information.19
1.2. Academic Approaches to Homeland Security
According to a report by the National Research Council, “the academic context 
of homeland security could be stretched to include almost every discipline and topic 
area imaginable, with homeland security serving more as a target for the application of 
such studies rather than as a descriptor of such studies themselves.”20 This description 
stems largely from the broad spectrum of meanings of homeland security and precisely 
evidences the biggest problem connected with the study of this area. Simply put, there 
are too many different topics treated as homeland security, yet they are either mostly too 
narrowly focused on a particular field or issue to provide a comprehensive analysis of 
homeland security or too shallow to provide any substantial analysis beyond simple 
textbook-like description. Due to the non-existence of a well articulated, explicitly 
delineated, and widely shared definition of homeland security, there is also virtually no 
consensus on how to research and analyze homeland security.
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the proposition of the homeland security agenda 
by the Bush administration ushered in a heightened attention of scholars as well as 
policy analysts and professionals to the various topics included under the term. A vast 
volume of research immediately after 9/11 was devoted to the study of terrorism, 
explaining its root causes, U.S. anti-terrorism policies before 9/11 and policy 
recommendations on how to protect the United States from future threats. Many of these 
recommendations were focused on border and infrastructure protection, transportation 
security as well as on the threats of weapons of mass destruction and biochemical 
hazard risks. To name a few publications taking this approach, it is possible to highlight 
a volume edited by Paul R. Viotti et al. Terrorism and Homeland Security: Thinking 
                                               
19 National Strategy for Homeland Security. 2002.
20 National Research Council. 2005. Frameworks for Higher Education in Homeland Security.
Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.
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Strategically about Policy21, Russell D. Howard et al. edited volume Homeland Security 
and Terrorism: Readings and Interpretations22, or Mark A. Sauter and James Jay 
Carafano’s Homeland Security: A Complete Guide to Understanding, Preventing, and 
Surveying Terrorism23.
After the disaster of hurricane Katrina in 2005, a large number of homeland 
security literature focused on preparedness for natural disasters and emergency 
management.24 Other authors concentrate on more specific aspects of homeland security 
such as critical infrastructure protection (Robert Radvanovski and Allan McDougall25) 
or border security and immigration policies (Edward Allden26). 
Some scholars take an altogether different approach focusing on legal issues 
connected with homeland security and on the question of relationship between 
homeland security and democracy. They analyze topics such as problems of civil rights 
protection under heightened homeland security policies or legislative and judicial
oversight. Among authors focusing on these topics are James Beckman27, Joe Whitley 
and Lynn Zusman28, or Martin Alperer29. And yet another different group of scholars 
touches upon the international relations aspect of homeland security and how adoption 
of homeland security policies affects relations among countries, these authors are for 
example Imtiaz Hussain and Satya R. Pattnayak30 or Anja Dalgaarg-Nielsen and Daniel 
Hamilton31. 
                                               
21 Viotti, Paul R., Opheim, Michael A., Bowen Nicholas (eds.). 2008. Terrorism and Homeland Security: 
Thinking Strategically about Policy. Boca Raton: CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group.
22 Howard, Russell D., Forest, James J.F., Moore, Joanne C. (eds.). 2006. Homeland Security and 
Terrorism: Readings and Interpretations. New York: McGraw-Hill.
23 Sauter, Mark A., Carafano, James Jay. 2005.
24 Among some of the most important publications dedicated to natural disasters and emergency 
management are: Miskel, James F. 2006. Disaster Response and Homeland Security: What Works, What 
Doesn’t. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International or Haddow, George, Bullock, Jane, Coppola 
Damon P (eds.). 2007. Introduction to Emergency Management (Homeland Security Series). Oxford: 
Butterworth-Heinemann.
25 Radvanovsky, Robert, McDougall, Allen. 2010. Critical Infrastructure: Homeland Security and 
Emeregency Preparedness. Boca Raton: CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group.
26 Alden, Edward. 2008. The Closing of the American Border: Terrorism, Immigration, and Security since 
9/11. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.
27 Beckman James. 2007. Comparative Legal Approaches to Homeland Security and Anti-terrorism.
London: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
28 Whitley, Joe D., Zusman, Lynn K. 2009. Homeland Security: Legal and Policy Issues. Chicago: ABA 
Publishing.
29 Alperer, Martin. 2011. Foundations of Homeland Security: Law and Policy. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley 
& Sons.
30 Hussain, Imtiaz A., Pattnayak, Satya R., Hira, Anil. 2008. North American Homeland Security: Back to 
Bilateralism? Westport: Praeger Security International.
31 Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja, Hamilton Daniel S. (eds.). 2006. Transatlantic Homeland Security: Protecting 
Society in the Age of Catastrophic Terrorism. New York: Routledge.
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The above-mentioned overview of different scholarly approaches to homeland 
security sheds only a small light on the plethora of available literature devoted to 
homeland security issues. Yet, only a few authors provide a comprehensive view on the 
U.S. government’s reorganization based on organizational theory approach. Of these 
few authors, some focus more on public management and bureaucracy approach. 
Because the reorganization of the U.S. government after 9/11 was the most monument 
effort since the 1947 National Security Act (which created the Department of Defense, 
the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council), there is no 
publication, which would be dedicated to an analysis of U.S. government reorganization 
and resistance to change on such a massive scale. Probably the closest is a 1975 A 
Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality and Organization in the State 
Department by Donald P. Warrick.32 Yet, given its older publication date and its 
specific focus on the State Department, its use for the purpose of this thesis is rather 
limited.
Authors who offer a more contemporary and homeland security related insights 
are primarily Donald F. Kettl33, Charles Perrow34 and Ufot B. Inamete35. Kettl studies in 
System under Stress the various challenges facing the Department of Homeland Security 
and other U.S. government agencies responsible for the homeland security agenda. He 
provides insights into the Bush administration’s decisions as well as Congressional 
policies connected with homeland security coordination. Charles Perrow analyzes in his 
article in Homeland Security Affairs journal the main setbacks and problematic aspects 
of the Department of Homeland Security and the intelligence reorganization. Ufot B. 
Inamete focuses in his article on the possibility of the use of the academic discipline of 
management, and looks into the benefits of the various fields such as organizational 
cultural studies, organizational change studies, and others, for the reorganization of 
homeland security and intelligence organizations.
In terms of the information sharing and intelligence reform literature, three 
authors tackle the question of intelligence community reform after 9/11 from an 
organizational point of view. The first is Amy Zegart, who in her book Spying Blind: 
                                               
32 Warrick, Donald P. 1975. A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality and Organization in 
the State Department. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
33 Kettl, Donald F. 2007.
34 Perrow, Charles. 2006. “The Disaster after 9/11: The Department of Homeland Security and the 
Intelligence Reorganization”. Homeland Security Affairs 2 (1): 1-32.
35 Inamete, Ufot B. 2006. “The Academic Discipline of Management and Homeland Security”. Review of 
Policy Research 23 (1): 197-222.
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The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/1136 creates a combined theoretical approach to 
study adaptation failure of U.S. intelligence community before 9/11 based on both 
organization theory and political science theory of rational choice decision making. 
Even though this scholar applies her framework to an explanation of U.S. intelligence 
community failure before 9/11, her combined framework proves useful even for 
evaluating the post-9/11 U.S. government reorganization. The other two authors are 
Glenn P. Hastedt and B. Douglas Skelley, who in their chapter Intelligence in a
Turbulent World: Insights from Organization Theory37 provide an insight of 
organization theory on the organizational structure, culture and management of the 
intelligence community. The next part of this chapter will present the main arguments 
for an organizational approach to homeland security.
1.3. Organization Theory and Homeland Security
In order to build a model of the U.S. government homeland security 
reorganization that allows a proper analysis, both the organization theory as well as the 
theory of new institutionalism and rational choice decision-making will be used. Even 
though, the main focus is on the organizational side of the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security and the subsequent intelligence community (IC) reform – on their
internal structures, cultures and management – attention also has to be paid to processes 
outside of the DHS and IC. These explain the influence of leadership decision-making 
as well as the institutional design of the American democratic principles on the final 
outcome of the U.S. government reorganization.
The organization theory consists of a system of competing ideas some of which 
are useful for explaining the failure of the U.S. government reorganization to create a 
unified and efficient homeland security system. Classical organization theory is focused 
mostly on private corporations and businesses, thus it is necessary to adopt a 
bureaucratic perspective to the organization theory. Here, the logic may be summarized 
as follows. First, internal change is difficult for private companies38 and even more for 
                                               
36 Zegart, Amy. 2007. Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI and the Origins of 9/11. Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press.
37 Hastedt Glenn P., Skelley, Douglas B. 2009. “Intelligence in a Turbulent World: Insights from 
Organization Theory”. Pp. 112-130 in Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, Mark Phythian (eds.). Intelligence 
Theory: Key Questions and Debate. New York: Routledge.
38 Kaufmann, Herbert. 2005. The Limits of Organizational Change. New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers.
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governmental organizations.39 Second, internal resistance to change is powerful because 
it is based on both the organizational structure and also on an entrenched culture of 
values, norms, ideas and identities.40 Three reasons why organizations resist change can 
be characterized in the following manner. 
First, there is bounded rationality of organizational leaders, who settle for 
options to internal change that seem to them to be good, but which in fact might not be. 
However, because the leaders have usually incomplete information, cannot predict the 
future and are bound by cognitive constraints, it can lead them to adopt changes, which 
might be poorly identified, while the real problems are not addressed and deficiencies 
prevail.41
The second reason is structural secrecy. In order to be efficient, organizations 
specialize and divide to proficient subunits focusing on specific tasks. However, this 
kind of specialization prevents the efficient movement of knowledge and information 
within an organization. The resulting outcome is that “people in one part of the 
organization often lack the expertise to understand the work of people in other parts of 
the organization.”42 Structural secrecy makes it hard for managers to understand what 
exactly are the subunits doing and what needs to be changed. “The very structures, 
rules, and technologies designed to improve efficiency sabotage the organizations 
ability to learn and change.”43
Finally, the liability of time or institutional inertia is the third factor limiting the 
organizational change. All organizations become more resistant to change as routines, 
norms, and relationships get established over time. Here, the problem is multifaceted. 
Organizational management supports standardization in operating procedures, 
motivation of employees, etc. But the very measures that create stability and reliability 
reduce the probability of change.44 In addition, the growing homogeneity of 
organizational culture – i.e. norms, relationships, and behaviors – leads employees to be 
                                               
39 Ibid.
40 Egeberg, Morton. 2003. “How Bureaucratic Structure Matters: An Organizational Perspective”. Pp. 
116-126 in B. Guy Peters, John Pierre (eds.). Handbook of Public Administration. London: Sage 
Publications.
41 Simon, Herbert A. 1976. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-making Processes in 
Administrative Organizations. New York: Free Press.
42 Zegart, Amy. 2007, p. 52
43 Treverton, Gregory F. 2009. Intelligence for an Age of Terror. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 110.
44 Hannan, Michael T., Freeman John. 1984. “Structural Inertia and Organizational Change”. American 
Sociological Review 49: 149-164.
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naturally resistant to change of the way things have been done because they have 
become comfortable and used to the old procedures.45
These three obstacles to change apply to all organizations. However, change is 
even harder for government agencies. This is because governmental institutions are 
generally designed to be both stable and durable and hence resistant to change. 
Government institutions place a high value on reliability, predictability and consistency 
in performing their tasks.46 Moreover, it is much easier for government agencies to 
resist change because they are not operating in a competitive market environment, 
which motivates private companies to adapt in order to survive. 
Also, the political environment in which government institutions operate makes 
it difficult for them to change. The political backing for the creation or reform of a 
governmental agency relies on compromising political coalitions. Political opposition in 
the American democratic political system has various means to limit or hamper the 
reform or creation of a new agency.47
Another obstacle to governmental agency change in comparison to the private 
sector is that managers of governmental organizations are restricted by many more 
rules, conflicting goals and bureaucratic red tape. The process of managerial decisions 
such as hiring and firing employees, or acquiring more funds is required to move 
through a complicated system of bureaucratic layers, which ultimately makes it difficult 
for the governmental agencies to change.
Another way of changing agencies that are not managed internally is an imposed 
change from the outside, through executive or legislative action. These processes are not 
at the core of the argument of this thesis, but have a certain effect on the final outcome 
of the U.S. homeland security government reorganization and therefore need to be 
mentioned. Especially important is the fact that even here obstacles to organizational 
change emerge. These consist of the rational self-interest decision making of both the 
president as well as the legislators. 
For presidents the incentives to improve organizational effectiveness exist and 
presidents are expected to promote it by constituents. However, presidents must 
prioritize among issues on their packed agendas. With limited election terms, presidents 
                                               
45 Kaufman, Herbert. 1976. Are Governmental Organizations Immortal? Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press or Downs, Anthony. 1967. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little Brown.
46 Meyer, Marshall W., Zucker, Lynne G. 1989. Permanently Failing Organizations. Newbury Park, CA: 
Sage Publications.
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focus mostly on issues that directly concern voters, rather then on changing the 
complicated organizational design of governmental agencies. As Zegart concludes, 
“presidents are especially reluctant to push for agency reforms in the absence of a crisis 
or in the presence of anticipated resistance.”48 Also for legislators the topic of agency 
reform is mostly not attractive enough to delve into. Especially topics such as the 
intelligence reform have weak connection to voters in their electoral districts. 
A second external barrier to U.S. homeland security government reorganization
stems from some key principles of American democracy – its decentralized system of 
federal government and stress on civil liberties. The federal system of government, as 
was already mentioned, enables political opposition to mitigate the final outcomes of 
proposed reforms. Also, the emphasis on civil liberties usually complicates any attempts 
to reform and centralize federal government out of the fear of civil rights violations if 
more power was vested in the federal government.
This overview of the homeland security and organizational theory literatures 
highlights a number of key themes relevant to reform of the U.S. homeland security 
government reorganization post-9/11. All organizations by their very nature are resistant 
to substantial change and are constrained by rational self-interest of key decision 
makers. In addition, public institutions must take into account their political 
environment. In the case, of homeland security and intelligence organizations strong 
popular support for liberal democratic principles is a central consideration. Each of 
these three themes provides the building blocks for the research methodology used in 
this thesis.
1.4. Research Methodology
Given the complex theoretical framework applied to the study of the U.S. 
homeland security, the research methodology requires a comprehensive approach. Thus, 
the actual research method used in this thesis may be summarized as an analytical and 
evaluative organizational narrative. The research methodology used in this thesis is 
based on an Eastonian49 input/output perspective on U.S. government reorganization. 
                                                                                                                                         
47 Moe, Terry. 1989. “The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure”.  Pp. 267-322 in John E. Chubb, Paul E. 
Peterson (eds.). Can the Government Govern? Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
48 Zegart, Amy. 2007, p. 57.
49 David Easton, a renowned political scientist, created a model of political system based on input and 
output factors which are influenced by external environment. For more on Easton’s application of systems 
theory of political science, see e.g. Easton, David. 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
- 25 -
The basic features of this methodological approach are presented schematically in 
Figure 1.1.
Within this Figure 1.1 the development of the U.S. domestic counterterrorism
before 9/11 as well as actions undertaken in order to promote the homeland security 
agenda post 9/11 are considered to be inputs into the original institutional design of the 
U.S. government. Thereafter, the impact of the pre-9/11 situation and post-9/11 
reorganization proposals will be evaluated using an organizational and rational-decision 
making framework. Lastly, the output or actual implementation of the legislation 
reforming the U.S. executive branch will be evaluated based on the criteria of 
efficiency.
The U.S. homeland security institutions depicted by the box in the center of 
Figure 1.1 consists of the internal organizational processes present within the U.S. 
government. These internal processes include the bounded rationality of homeland 
security management, informational asymmetry or ‘structural secrecy’ within the 
homeland security agencies, and the institutional inertia embedded within the homeland 
security agencies culture. The internal organizational processes are influenced by 
external processes entrenched in the political and societal environment. The external 
environment processes consist of executive and legislative decisions made by the self-
interest rationale of political leaders, as well as of the democratic societal values of 
citizens on the basis of deeply held beliefs regarding civil liberties.
Figure 1.1. Schematic representation of the research methodology
Note: This systems theory approach to homeland security provision, based on the work of Easton,50 views 
the work of homeland security institutions as being a product of the inputs into these institutions and the 
environment within which homeland security institutions operate. This model does not deal directly with 
the internal operations of homeland security institutions but suggests that institutional factors play an 
important role in mediating policy inputs and outputs.
                                               
50 Ibid., p. 32.
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The pre-9/11 socio-political context will be discussed in chapter 2. This context is 
viewed in Figure 1.1 as providing a key input to the development of U.S. domestic 
counterterrorism before 9/11. Within the approaches to the study of homeland security
presented in sections 2.1 and 2.2 of chapter 2, all of the previously mentioned themes 
such as limits of information sharing, methods and practice of agencies influencing 
institutions decisions and actions, and the advocacy of the status quo by former national 
security and policy-makers add to the pre-9/11 input will be discussed. Each of these 
themes has influenced the internal organizational design and culture of the U.S. 
homeland security.
Later in chapters 3, 4 and 5 the focus will shift to an examination of the input 
provided by reactions to the post-9/11 terrorist attacks on governmental and legislative 
initiatives to reorganize the U.S. government in order to create a unified homeland 
security agenda. These actions have also had an impact on the internal institutional 
processes within the homeland security agencies. Chapter 6 will thereafter evaluate all 
the interconnected input processes influencing the final output of the post-
reorganization homeland security agenda in terms of its efficiency.
The evidence for the analysis and evaluation of the U.S. homeland security 
reorganization presented in following chapters is drawn from a wide range of 
unclassified and declassified policy documents. This type of evidence is composed of 
various commission recommendations, official reports and working papers analyzing 
the pre-9/11 and post-9/11 state of the U.S. counterterrorism and homeland security 
policies, internal agency evaluation documents of the progress of implementing the 
homeland security reorganization propositions, various official strategies, and 
miscellaneous pieces of legislation related to the creation of unified homeland security.
1.5. Conclusion
In this chapter the theoretical and methodological framework for this research 
thesis has been presented. The theoretical approach adopted draws inspiration from 
insights derived from the literatures on intelligence and organizations. These insights 
have been used in conjunction with an Eastonian systems model to construct a 
methodological approach exploring the two main influences, or inputs, on U.S. 
government reorganization. In the next chapters, the process of applying the theoretical 
and methodological perspectives developed in the foregoing pages will be “put to the 
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test” and used to marshal the evidence to address the two key questions outlined in the 
introductory chapter.
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2. U.S. Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Strategy before 9/11
For about forty years the United States national security policy focused on one 
overriding target: the Soviet Union, and its satellites. Attention and resources were 
mostly directed against Soviet nuclear forces and its conventional forces threatening 
Western Europe.  However, with the end of the Cold War, the United States national 
security policy and strategy faced a dilemma of finding its purpose in a new unipolar 
world.  The old adversary had disappeared and a new one was coming in many different 
forms and shapes. The United States national security policy was expected to adapt to 
these new threats and to focus on a changed set of targets. The ability (or inability) to 
adapt to these changes forms part of the pre-9/11 input to the U.S. homeland security 
reorganization outlined earlier in the systems theory model presented in Figure 1.1.
This chapter will first focus on the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism strategy 
and the changing perceptions of possible threats to the U.S. homeland during and after 
the Cold War. During the Cold War, U.S. national security officials focused primarily 
on offensive measures against the Soviet Union and its allies. Attention to civil defense 
as well as to the potentiality of terrorist attacks was viewed as marginal. In the second 
section of this chapter the U.S. intelligence community’s attempt to respond to the 
changed security environment will be analyzed. This will include the intelligence 
community’s aim at improving its capability to collect, analyze and share information 
on potential terrorist threats. The final part of this chapter will examine the main 
obstacles to implementing the recommendations of a number of blue-ribbon 
commissions and governmental initiatives, which suggested government reorganization 
and the need to focus on terrorist threats prior to 9/11.
2.1. Pre-9/11 Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Strategies
During the Cold War, the United States relied primarily on offensive measures. 
Rather than defending the homeland on U.S. shores, the United States decided to 
concentrate on threats of preemption or massive nuclear retaliation to a Soviet attack. 
Although as homeland security experts Mark Sauter and James Jay Carafano point out, 
there were attempts to create a defense oriented approach at the outset of Cold War, the 
offensive approach “squelched demand for increased civil defense and preparedness, 
both for natural and human-caused disasters.”51 It was not until 1979 when Federal 
                                               
51 Sauter, Mark A., Carafano, James Jay. 2005, p. 14.
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Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was established to coordinate all federal 
support to state and local governments following hurricanes, floods and earthquakes. 
During the Reagan presidency, FEMA’s responsibilities also included the protection of 
critical infrastructure and response to potential terrorist attacks. It must be noted 
however that substantial funding ended as the Cold War started to die down in 1988.52
The threats of a terrorist attack were known to U.S. national security policy-
makers during the Cold War, but they were mostly understood as being peripheral to the 
threat posed by the Soviet Union and its communist counterparts. Although a number of 
terrorist attacks were carried out in the United States primarily by left-wing extremists 
during the 1970s and early 1980s, the focus of the government (even though limited) 
was mainly on state-sponsored terrorist threats to Americans abroad. As one 
counterterrorist scholar contends, it was only after “the 1983 bombing of the U.S. 
Embassy and Marine base in Beirut, killing some 270 Americans, that the U.S. 
government, for the first time in history, seriously decided to develop a more coherent 
and proactive strategy dealing with terrorism.”53 A commission set up within the 
Department of Defense under the leadership of formal Navy Commander L.J. Long 
recommended a major shift in national policy from reactive anti-terrorism posture to 
proactive counterterrorism strategies. Based on the recommendations of the Long 
Commission, the Department of Defense began to regard terrorism as an elevated top 
security concern.54
In the aftermath of the hijacking of the 1985 TWA flight 847 and the Achille 
Lauro cruise ship, President Reagan appointed Vice President George H.W. Bush to 
chair a cabinet level Task Force on Combating Terrorism. Its outcome was to be the 
most search study of U.S. counterterrorism strategy attempted to date. It recommended 
a broad range of actions, such as efforts to improve coordination among government 
agencies, creation of a full-time position on the National Security Council staff, and the 
establishment of a consolidated intelligence center on terrorism.55
Another important tool of U.S. counterterrorism strategy was embedded in the 
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986.56 The most important 
                                               
52 Goldfisher, David. 2008, p. 41.
53 Alexander, Yonah. 2006. “United States”. P. 27 in Yonah Alexander. Counterterrorism Strategies: 
Successes and Failures of Six Nations. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc.
54 Ibid.
55 Naftali, Timothy. 2005. Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism. New York: 
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56 For full version of the Omnibus Act see: <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
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provision provided the U.S. law enforcement agencies with the legal authority to 
conduct criminal investigations abroad. Ultimately, it resulted in the stationing of FBI 
legal attaches in the U.S. embassies abroad.57 “History is likely to record that 1986 was 
the year when the world, at long last, came to grips with the plague of terrorism,”58
commented President Reagan in May 1986. In reality, the counterterrorism policies had 
not led to diminishing of terrorism. In December 1988, mid-air explosion of Pan Am 
Flight 103 was perpetrated by Libyan agents over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 
passengers and people on the ground and the 1990s were to see ever expanding number 
of terrorist attacks both abroad and inside the United States.
Following attacks on U.S. forces in Yemen and Somalia, foreign terrorists struck 
the American homeland in February 1993, setting off a bomb in the underground 
parking lot at New York City’s World Trade Center. The bombing of the Alfred P. 
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City two years later combined with concerns 
over a potential attack of Aum Shinrikyo cult59 spurred funding for some 
counterterrorism activities related to homeland security. Federal expenditures for 
domestic preparedness against weapons of mass destruction from 1995 to 2000 
accelerated from almost nothing to $1.5 billion.60 President Clinton issued in June 1995 
Presidential Decision Directive 39 called U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism61, in which it 
was declared that “the United States would pursue all efforts to deter and preempt, 
apprehend and prosecute, or assist other governments to prosecute individuals who 
perpetrate or plan to perpetrate such attacks.”62
In 1996, after the unveiling of Operation Bojinka (a failed Al Qaeda plot to 
bomb twelve U.S. airliners mid-air over the Atlantic Ocean, combined with 
simultaneous assassinations of Pope John Paul II. and President Clinton), a Commission 
on Aviation Safety and Security led by Vice President Al Gore concluded in its final 
report that “terrorist attacks on civil aviation are directed at the United States and that 
                                               
57 Steven, Graeme, C. S., Gunaratna, Rohan. 2004. Counterterrorism: A Reference Handbook. Santa 
Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., p. 213.
58 Transcript of President Ronald Reagan Radio Address to the Nation on Terrorism from May 31, 1986 
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government of the use of WMD and biochemical weapons by terrorist groups.
60 Sauter, Mark A., Carafano, James Jay. 2005, p. 17.
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62 Ibid.
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there should be an ongoing federal commitment to reducing the threats they pose.”63
Some measures improving the aviation security were adopted in the Anti-Terrorism Act
of 1996.64 And among other things, this piece of legislation also raised funding for 
federal anti-terrorism law enforcement efforts. In 1997, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici 
Preparedness Program was launched to train first responders – fire, police, and 
emergency medical technicians – in 120 of the largest U.S. cities to deal with WMD 
terrorist attacks.65
During the period from 1998 to 2000, Al Qaeda and its supporters continued 
their attacks abroad, hitting U.S. military facilities and embassies. In 1998, Osama bin 
Laden pledged to escalate his campaign to drive America from the Middle East. While 
the Clinton administration ultimately launched diplomatic initiatives, financial 
crackdowns, prosecutions, covert operations, and even a missile attack against bin 
Laden and his followers, U.S. policy responses never reflected the enormity of the 
threat. In the years shortly before 9/11, two bipartisan blue-ribbon commissions warned 
of the threats of terrorism and unpreparedness of the U.S. government to successfully 
face them. The first was the 21st Century Commission formed in 1999 and led by former 
U.S. Senators Warren B. Rudman and Gary Hart. In its final report published in 2000 
the Hart-Rudman Commission warned of the growing threat of terrorist attacks on
American homeland possibly using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons in the next 
25 years. In order to improve the U.S. capabilities to face this challenge, the Hart-
Rudman Commission recommended creation of the “National Homeland Security 
Agency with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. 
government activities involved in homeland security.”66
The second bipartisan panel was the National Commission on Terrorism formed 
in 1999 and chaired by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer. Its 2000 report concluded that 
international terrorism poses an increasing dangerous and difficult threat to America 
and the United States needs to significantly step up its efforts in order to counter this 
growing danger, that the priority is prevention of terrorist attacks and the U.S. 
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intelligence and law enforcement communities much use the full scope of their authority 
to collect intelligence regarding terrorist plans and methods. It also suggested that the 
President and Congress should reform the system for reviewing and funding 
departmental counterterrorism programs to ensure that the activities and programs of 
various agencies are part of a comprehensive plan.67
Notwithstanding these recommendations the U.S. government strategies in both 
the Clinton and early Bush administrations were marked by a focus on the threat abroad 
rather than at home, treatment of terrorism as a primarily law enforcement issue, 
competing priorities and limited resources, poor information sharing and analysis.68 The 
next sub-chapter will provide an insight into the U.S. intelligence community structure 
and will attempt to explain why the intelligence community failed to share information 
and properly warn of the 9/11 attacks.
2.2. U.S. Intelligence in the Post-Cold War Environment: Adapting to New 
Threats
As mentioned in the previous sections, the security environment underwent a 
great change after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
communist threat had diminished and there was no apparent threat from any foreign 
military power or any hostile ideology of comparable reach to that of the Soviet 
Union.69 However, different types of threats to U.S. national security emerged. 
The main characteristic of these threats is their asymmetric and transnational 
nature. The transnational aspect of these threats can be characterized by their disrespect 
for national boundaries and cross border operational mode. These threats include 
international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, and organized crime.70
Transnational threats and the actors responsible for them were not new for U.S. 
intelligence; the intelligence community had been active against organized crime and 
drug traffickers even during the Cold War. Similarly, terrorism was a re-occurring issue 
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with recognized threats since 1970s. But as Gregory Treverton points out, the novelty 
was: (1) in the growing importance of transnational threats, especially of terrorism, and 
(2) in the range of concern for transnational threats, which (again most notably 
terrorism) became the primary activity for intelligence.71
Also, the spectrum of present and potential transnational threats has been 
broadening, thus creating the need for the intelligence community to adapt in order to be 
able to follow this growing number of targets. Whereas during the Cold War the 
problem was a general lack of information, the post-Cold War environment presented 
the opposite challenge for the intelligence community – too much information 
stemming from the vast range of transnational threats. Mark M. Lowenthal, a leading 
scholar of intelligence studies, contends that “deciding what to focus on in the absence 
of the overwhelming Soviet threat and in the midst of nearly a decade of severe budget 
cuts was a daunting managerial challenge”.72
The terrorist threats did, indeed, stand out among the many other transnational 
threats identified after the end of the Cold War. Some intelligence officials argued that 
intelligence agencies did recognize the importance of the terrorist threats and allocated 
its resources and launched new programs to combat terrorism well before 9/11. As 
former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Robert Gates stated in 1994, the U.S. 
intelligence community started to readjust its priorities and shifted its resources away 
from the Soviet and other communist-related targets and missions soon after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. For example, in 1980, 58 percent of the whole intelligence 
community’s budget were devoted to following the Soviet-related threats, while by 
1993 this figure had dropped to just 13 percent.73 Even though specific budget figures 
for the intelligence community are classified, it appears resources were reallocated to 
fight terrorism. As the conclusions of the Joint Inquiry suggest, despite the time of tight 
budgets during the 1990s, direct spending on counterterrorism roughly quintupled.74
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Moreover, both within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) incentives to transform and to address the terrorist threats 
evolved. According to the testimony of former Director of the FBI (1993-2001) Louis J. 
Freeh before the 9/11 Commission, the FBI had more than tripled its counterterrorism 
budget by 1999; it had also doubled the number of agents working on counterterrorism 
cases and expanded the number of its Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) to improve 
coordination with local law enforcement.75
George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence from 1997 to 2003, stated in his 
testimony before the Joint Inquiry that both the CIA as well as the intelligence 
community as a whole had focused on the terrorist threats posed by al Qaeda and other 
Islamist terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah or Egyptian Islamist Jihad. An 
interagency approach was adopted through the Counterterrorism Center (CTC), under 
the auspices of the DCI. Among other CIA initiatives were: a new comprehensive 
strategy against al Qaeda called “The Plan”, a nationwide program for hiring qualified 
personnel for counterterrorism tasks, a counterterrorism educational programs, and 
measures taken to improve cooperation with the FBI such as exchange of senior 
officials.76
However, as Gregory Treverton, a renowned intelligence expert, points out, the 
U.S. intelligence community faced a number of Cold War legacies, which were 
mismatched to the changed threats. These legacies were all based on divisions and 
boundaries. On the organizational side, the collection of intelligence was divided into 
“stovepipes” by source: human intelligence (HUMINT) under the CIA, signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) under the National Security Agency (NSA), imagery intelligence 
(IMINT) under the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). The analysis part 
was also organized primarily by agency and not by issue or problem. The CIA was 
responsible for “all-source” analysis, but other agencies had their analysis units as well, 
such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) under the Department of Defense 
(DOD). The second division was, thus, on the CIA/DOD line. The CIA was an 
independent entity, while agencies performing signals and imagery intelligence were 
located within the DOD. Focusing on one target supported competition between the 
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agencies, which proved generally beneficial during the Cold War. But the competition 
also led to many turf wars between the agencies and had a negative effect on 
cooperation, which became crucial for countering the transnational threats. The last 
divide was on the domestic-foreign intelligence axis. Out of concern for civil liberties, 
the CIA was prohibited from performing internal security functions. These powers were 
vested in the FBI, which, however, was first and foremost a law enforcement agency, 
and therefore oriented mostly reactively not preventively. Moreover, the barrier between 
domestic and foreign intelligence had negative effects on information sharing and 
cooperation as well.77
The intelligence community pre-9/11 attempted to transform itself amid the new 
terrorist threats by reallocating resources and creating new initiatives. However, the 
pace of the transformation was not efficient enough given the limited resources as well 
as the obstacles within the organizations stemming from the Cold War legacy of the 
institutional design of the intelligence community. As a result, the events of 9/11 
highlighted the unpreparedness and ineffectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community 
to prevent a terrorist attack. 
Various commissions and initiatives throughout the 1990’s identified most of the 
deficiencies of the U.S. intelligence community and the importance of adaptation of the 
intelligence community organization to the transnational threats. Yet, similar to the 
attempts to create a concentrated counterterrorism effort and unified homeland security 
policy as recommended by the Hart-Rudman Commission, these recommendations were 
largely unrecognized by any legislative action.
According to Amy Zegart, a leading expert on U.S. intelligence reform and 
national security, twelve major bipartisan commissions, governmental studies, and think 
tank task forces examined the U.S. intelligence community and U.S. counterterrorism 
efforts between the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. Zegart contends that “[a]ll of their reports urged reform within 
intelligence agencies, across the intelligence community and other parts of the U.S. 
government.”78 Together the studies proposed 514 recommendations on wide range of 
issues, 340 of them were directed specifically towards improving and fixing the U.S. 
intelligence community. Yet, none of these recommendations resulted in a substantial 
change of either the U.S. intelligence community or U.S. government institutions 
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responsible for homeland security and counterterrorism. There are a number of reasons 
why the change before 9/11 did not materialize. These reasons will be examined in the 
final section of this chapter.
2.3. Obstacles to Institutional Change before 9/11
Answering the question why were the pre-9/11 recommendations largely 
ignored by national security officials and policymakers requires a multifaceted 
perspective. The first and largest obstacle was the general aversion of organizations 
toward reform. Such resistance opposed both internal initiatives espousing change and 
external attempts imposed through legislation or executive action. The second obstacle 
is embedded in the very principles of American democracy, which are based on 
protection of civil liberties, as well as on the fragmentation and decentralization of the 
U.S. system of government. The third obstacle is based on the rational interests of the 
U.S. leaders, i.e. the tradeoffs between incentives for change and the actual capabilities 
to make the change, which largely effect the decision making of the U.S. leaders. This 
three level approach facilitates creation of an explanatory model of resistance to U.S. 
government reorganization in order to enhance its ability to face terrorist threats before 
9/11 despite the widespread recognition of this threat during the 1990s.
2.3.1. Organizational Obstacles
As noted in the first chapter, organizations in general do not change easily79, for 
government agencies change is even harder80, and for government agencies involved in 
homeland security an information sharing it is particularly so.81 All organizations have 
to overcome three types of problems when attempting to change: (1) bounded 
rationality82 – cognitive limits of individuals affecting the decision-making and 
management of organizations; (2) structural secrecy or information asymmetry83 –
specialization of subunits preventing knowledge sharing; and (3) liability of time or 
institutional inertia84– growing resistance to change as routines, norms and relationships 
become established. As Amy Zegart contends, for government agencies these problems 
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are heightened, because they lack three key advantages that the business organizations 
enjoy.85
The first is the lack of market competition, which in private sector creates the 
incentives for reform to promote better efficiency and effectiveness if they want to 
survive. Government agencies do not face this immediate threat of diminishing or 
replacement due to poor performance. The Congress does have oversight capabilities. 
However, its powers to dissolve an intelligence agency are limited.
The second advantage that government agencies lack is that the owners and 
employees of private companies generally want them to succeed and therefore create 
and support the incentives for change. On the contrary, government agencies’ reform is 
often thwarted by political opponents who obstruct the legislative process, and thus 
limit the likelihood of success of reform. In the case of the creation of counterterrorism 
and homeland security agenda, the role of the Department of Defense lobby proved 
crucial as it effectively blocked many of the initiatives attempting to reorganize national 
security agencies, including the intelligence community, which would reduced its 
authority in any way.86
The third disadvantage when comparing the government agencies to the private 
sector are the limits imposed on the actual managerial work of public sector officials, 
who are bound with bureaucratic red tape and have much less freedom in their decision-
making as opposed to managers of private companies. Intelligence officials serve many 
different consumers from the president, his advisors and members of the Congress, who 
all have different and often conflicting preferences. This makes it very difficult to make 
internal adjustments.87
2.3.2. Democratic Principles
American democratic principles limited organizational changes enhancing U.S.
counterterrorism efforts in two ways. First, as was already mentioned above, there is the 
fragmented and decentralized political system based on separation of powers, 
congressional committee system, and majority rule. Within this system it is possible for
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political opponents to hinder the enactment of new legislation and thus curb or thwart 
any reform process altogether.88
Another way in which the democratic process negatively influenced the process 
of improving U.S. counterterrorism abilities on the information sharing level was its 
emphasis on civil liberties. Any change of the U.S. government, which would led to 
heightened domestic intelligence or cooperation of CIA on domestic affairs was 
immediately criticized. Such opposition was based on fears of limiting civil liberties and 
creating a “big brother” kind of institution – something highly unpopular with the 
American public.89
2.3.3. Rational Decision-making
The last obstacle is a result of the differing capabilities and incentives of 
decision-makers. Both the president and legislators are well-aware of the difficulty of 
enforcing a major government reorganization connected with national security issues. 
The general unpopularity of the topic among voters as well as the community itself 
lowers the decision-makers incentives even more. Moreover, national security 
bureaucrats promote their own interests. These are mostly adhering to the status quo, as 
no agency wants to yield authority or discretion to any other ‘rival’ organization.90
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2.4. Conclusion
This chapter has explored the challenges facing the United States’ faced in 
adapting to threats of transnational terrorism after the fall of the Soviet Union. These 
threats were not new to U.S. national security officials. Yet, they were viewed as 
marginal in the Cold War context. U.S. counterterrorism strategies concentrated on 
threats emanating from state-sponsored terrorism focused on U.S. targets abroad. It was 
not only until shortly before 9/11 that the possibility of devastating terrorist attack on 
the American homeland was expressed by a Congressional Commission, which called 
for a concerted effort to protect the homeland. Other various reform initiatives during 
the 1990s recommended reform within the U.S. intelligence community in order to 
improve its abilities to collect, analyze and first and foremost share information on 
terrorist threats. 
However, none of the recommendations materialized in a substantial change of 
U.S. counterterrorism policy able to face terrorist attack. One influential approach based 
on historical experience suggests that real reform or change is only possible amid a 
catastrophe or crisis. Pearl Harbor and entrance into WWII were the impetus leading to 
the creation of the CIA and a subsequent restructuring of the whole system of the U.S. 
national security. Only after the events of 9/11 and from the perspective of hindsight did 
the deficiencies of the U.S. counterterrorism abilities become widely visible and hence 
impossible to ignore. The question of whether the worst terrorist attack in the history of 
the United States was a catalyst strong enough to promote efficient U.S. government 
reorganization and endorse a unified homeland security agenda will be examined in the 
following chapters of this thesis.
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3. Immediate Reaction to 9/11: Introducing the Homeland Security 
Agenda
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were unprecedented in American 
history. Their extent and brutality, combined with the fact that they were carried out on 
the American soil, provided a unique opportunity for the largest transformation of the 
U.S. government since 1947. The shocked American public was willing to sacrifice 
some of its civil liberties in exchange for protection. Also, the rational self-interests of 
the President as well as the legislators shifted towards support for government 
reorganization. 
In the immediate reaction to 9/11, President Bush and the U.S. Congress 
promoted initiatives focused on improving the U.S.’s domestic counterterrorism 
strategy. The first initiative, included enacting the USA Patriot Act, which had a 
positive impact on the highly criticized deficiency of information sharing as it removed 
the barriers of information sharing between the law enforcement and intelligence
agencies. 
The second initiative was the proposition of a comprehensive homeland security 
agenda. The first step was an establishment of the White House Office of Homeland 
Security (OHS), by executive order of the president, in early October 2001. The OHS 
was envisaged to coordinate the dozens of agencies from the U.S. Coast Guard and the 
U.S. Border Patrol, to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) responsible for the protection of homeland 
security. Yet this model soon proved to be insufficient and an initiative to create a new 
Department of Homeland Security was introduced in the National Strategy of Homeland 
Security. 
This chapter will first present the main provisions included in the USA Patriot 
Act, and then the processes behind the creation of the homeland security agenda will be 
examined. As was the case with the pre-9/11 context of the U.S. homeland security 
government reorganization, these initiatives also serve as an input factor to the 
evaluation of the final outcome of the creation of a unified and efficient homeland 
security system.
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3.1. USA Patriot Act
Within days of the 9/11 attacks, “the Bush administration presented Congress 
with proposals to expand police and prosecutorial powers to enhance the fight against 
terrorism”.91 Six weeks later, these proposals culminated in the adoption of the Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act, or the USA Patriot Act.92 It passed both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate by wide margins – 375 to 66 and 98 to 1 respectively.93
As a result of the speedy manner in which Congress presented (Oct. 23), debated, and 
implemented this policy (voting in the House was held on Oct. 24 and in the Senate on 
Oct. 25) there was little controversy surrounding its inception.94
The main aim of the USA Patriot Act was to strengthen the abilities of the U.S. 
government agencies to collect and share information regarding ongoing investigations 
of terror plots. Another aim was to enable the U.S. government to be better equipped to 
identify, investigate, follow, detain, prosecute and punish suspected terrorists. Among 
the most important provisions in the Act included the following:95
 It allowed for federal warrants to be effective nationwide and no longer 
limited to special districts;
 It enabled law enforcement to obtain subpoena power for alleged terrorists’ 
communications, including fixed and wireless telephones, e-mail, web 
surfing, as well as unopened voice mail and e-mail;
 It attached roving wiretaps to alleged terrorists and thereby eliminated the 
need for the government to request wiretaps for specific telephone numbers 
as previously required;
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 It improved coordination and cooperation, such as information gathering 
between US intelligence and law enforcement investigators, with respect to 
terrorist organizations;
 It allowed law enforcement to use new subpoena power to obtain payment 
information such as credit card or bank account numbers, of suspected 
terrorists who are utilizing the Internet;
 It created rules to counter terrorists’ access to, and use of illicit funds as well 
as to prevent or impede other improper terrorist activities; and 
 It aimed to punish those who aided or harbored terrorists.
The importance of the USA Patriot Act with regards to the U.S. intelligence was 
embedded in the provisions, which enhanced domestic surveillance as an amendment of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. Also, the Act provided for possible 
sharing of information on criminal probes between law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies and other parts of the government. Thus, eliminating one of the main 
deficiencies of the U.S. counterterrorist intelligence criticized even before 9/11.
When President Bush signed the USA Patriot Act, “he declared that the purpose 
of the legislation was the pursuit, the defeat, and the bringing to justice of the terrorists 
who declared war on the United States. His message was a reflection of the new 
national security policy of the United States: Preventive action against American 
enemies before they can strike against the United States.”96
However, the USA Patriot Act was only a quick fix to some of the main 
information sharing deficiencies. It did not (and was not intended to) address the 
structural problems of the U.S. counterterrorism coordination. That was the task of the 
two following initiatives.
3.2. Office of the Homeland Security
The first steps in creating a unified policy and strategy of U.S. homeland 
security were undertaken less than one month after the attacks. On October 8, 2001 Tom 
Ridge, a former governor of Pennsylvania, was appointed as the Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Security and the Director of the newly established Office of 
Homeland Security (OHS). The Office’s mission was to “develop and coordinate the 
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implementation of a comprehensive strategy to secure the United States from terrorist 
threats or attacks. The Office’s objective was to coordinate the executive branch’s 
efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from 
terrorist attacks within the United States.”97
At the end of October 2002, the Homeland Security Council (HSC) was created 
by the President. Tom Ridge was put in charge of this Council. Among the members of 
the HSC were: the President and the Vice-President, Secretaries of Treasury, Defense, 
and Health Care, the Attorney General, the Director of Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), the Director of FBI, and the Director of CIA. The HSC’s role was to 
ensure the coordination of all homeland security related activities across the whole 
spectrum of federal, state and local offices and agencies.
However, this model of a so called “presidential advisor” proved insufficient. 
“In particular, critical voices in Congress pointed to inherent weaknesses in Ridge’s 
post. Without any budget authority, they argued, the Homeland Security czar lacked 
sufficient human and financial resources, had no way to enforce decisions, and relied 
primarily on the power of persuasion, albeit as a trusted advisor with unfettered access 
to President Bush.”98
According to Howard Ball, a distinguished homeland security scholar, Director Ridge 
“lacked substantive budgetary authority in two major ways: first, the executive order 
creating the OHS did not give Ridge that power; and second, it did not enable Ridge to 
formally certify the budget proposals of other entities with homeland security 
responsibilities that he was to coordinate.”99 As has been noted, “budgetary control is 
the key to influencing policy, and centralization of responsibility is essential to 
improving policy.”100 Without budgetary authority over the agencies responsible for 
providing domestic, or homeland, security, Ridge was powerless to compel agencies to 
cooperate with one another and with him.
On the other hand, there also existed fears of Ridge’s excessive influence that 
went beyond congressional accountability. These fears led Democratic Senator Joe 
Lieberman to propose in May 2002 a full-scale reorganization of the federal 
bureaucracy and a creation of a new department dealing with the questions of homeland 
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security. Even though President Bush had previously rejected proposals for such full-
scale government reorganization, the need for this change became imminent. Therefore, 
in June 2002 President Bush introduced his own proposal that “sought to maximize 
presidential influence over any new cabinet-level department”.101
In his speech to the nation on June 6, 2002,102 President Bush emphasized the 
need for essential reorganization of government by creating the Department of 
Homeland Security that would help the government to deal more effectively with the 
new threats of the 21st century. President Bush called for “creating a single permanent 
department with an overriding and urgent mission—securing the American homeland 
and protecting the American people.” He continued, “By ending duplication and 
overlap, we will spend less on overhead, and more on protecting America. This 
reorganization will give the good people of our government their best opportunity to 
succeed, by organizing our resources in a way that is thorough and unified.”103
The new National Strategy for Homeland Security prepared by Ridge’s OHS 
team was also introduced by the President in this speech.
3.3. National Homeland Security Strategy
The National Strategy for Homeland Security, issued on July 16 2002, 
introduced three main strategic objectives of combating terrorism on the domestic level: 
“(1) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; (2) reduce America’s 
vulnerability to terrorism; and (3) minimize the damage and recover from attacks that 
do occur.”104 The National Strategy for Homeland Security was divided into six key 
mission areas within which the strategy was supposed to operate. The first three areas 
were focused on the first objective of prevention, while the other two focused on the 
second aim of reducing vulnerability and the last focused on damage minimization and 
recovery. The framework of six critical mission areas was established as follows:
 Intelligence and Warning area, which included creation of an integrated 
federal approach to gathering, analysis, production, and sharing of 
information from both classified and open sources;
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 Border and Transportation Security area, which was aimed at preventing 
terrorists and terrorist materiel in entering the country by creating an 
interconnected system of border and transport infrastructure control that 
simultaneously secures the legitimate flow of people and goods;
 Domestic Counterterrorism area, which was focused on support for old and 
evolution of new intelligence and law enforcement efforts to identify 
terrorists and their supporters, prevents them from carrying attacks, and to 
arrest and prosecute them;
 Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets area, which involved 
precise and complete identification and prioritization of the U.S. 
infrastructure, including virtual networks, and assessment of consequences 
and connections among the infrastructures;
 Defending Against Catastrophic Threats area, which was primarily focused 
on detection, deterrence, prevention, and management of the consequences 
of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction; and
 Emergency Preparedness and Response area, which was aimed at 
minimizing the damage and rapid recovering from terrorist attacks which 
may occur.
The National Strategy for Homeland Security also identified the Department’s 
key role “as the unifying core of the vast national network and institutions involved in 
homeland security”105 and its main challenge in developing “complementary systems 
that avoid duplication and ensure essential requirements are met.”106 Moreover, it 
stressed that in order to meet the terrorist threat, the collaboration and coordination must 
be increased “in law enforcement and prevention, emergency response and recovery, 
policy development and implementation so that public and private resources are better 
aligned to secure the homeland”.107
3.4. Conclusion
The Bush administration reacted to the shocking events of 9/11 by proposing 
two different immediate initiatives: one legislative – the USA Patriot Act, and the other 
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executive – creation of the Office of Homeland Security by the Presidential Executive 
Order. Initially, President Bush and his advisers did not believe that that a permanent 
bureaucracy was needed. The “very notion [of a DHS] ran counter to the Republican 
mantra of fighting against big government.”108 However, by the spring 2002, the Bush 
administration changed course and started to prepare a draft proposal of government 
reorganization going against a proposal drafted by Senator Lieberman.
The next chapter will first analyze the political motivations for this sudden 
change and then will look in more detail on the final reorganization process of agencies 
within the Department of Homeland Security.
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4. Creating the Department of Homeland Security: A Domestic 
Counterterrorism Umbrella
According to Chris Hornbarger, “prior to 9/11, eleven of fourteen cabinet 
departments (State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Health 
and Human Services, Transportation, Energy, and Veterans Affairs), plus a host of 
independent and subordinate agencies (for example, the CIA, and FEMA) bore 
substantial responsibility for key aspects of homeland security”.109 This situation has 
changed with the Department of Homeland Security, which was established by the 
Homeland Security Act enactment on November 25, 2002.110 The new department 
combined twenty two agencies with approximately 180,000 employees including “such 
disparate organizations as: the new Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
(Transportation), the Secret Service (Treasury), FEMA, the Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center (FBI), and the Critical Infrastructures Assurance Office 
(Commerce)”.111 It became the fifteenth department in the history of U.S. government 
and a third biggest department of the Bush administration.
In the first part of this chapter, the political motivations and processes behind the 
crafting of the new department will be analyzed. Also, the original organizational 
structure of DHS and its main functions will be discussed. The second part of this 
chapter will present the results of the organizational rearrangements of the department 
after Michael Chertoff’s assumption of the post of Secretary of Homeland Security. The 
last section will deal in detail with the information and intelligence sharing aspect of 
homeland security and the role of DHS.
4.1. Crafting the New Department
As mentioned in the previous chapter, President Bush originally opposed the 
massive government reorganization promoting the Republican approach that opposed
“big government.” When Senator Joseph Lieberman and moderate Republican Arlen 
Specter introduced their bill proposal to create a cabinet-level agency responsible for 
homeland security, one subject to congressional oversight, “the Bush administration 
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furiously opposed the plan arguing that homeland security was an executive function, 
one that could be adequately coordinated only in the White House.”112
Nevertheless, pressure grew to create such a top-level homeland security 
department with congressional oversight. As Howard Ball contends, “during spring 
2002, at least eight different proposals were floating around Congress, all calling for a 
cabinet level DHS.”113 Under these circumstances, and with the November 2002 
congressional elections looming, the Bush administration felt it could not let the Senate 
Democrats take the lead on homeland security. According to a group of researches from 
the Center for Defense Management Reform, the White House concluded that is it 
wanted to take back the homeland security issue and nothing but the biggest merger in 
modern history would do.114
As Paul C. Light points out “there is nothing quite like the homeland security 
merger in the history of the federal government. The creation of the Defense 
Department after World War II involved more people, but the Homeland Security 
merger involved many more agencies, split and recombined many of their component 
parts, and, astoundingly, demanded that they focus on a mission almost none of them 
had ever dealt with before: combating terrorism.”115 Moreover, Congress wanted the 
new department to operate without any budget or personnel increases. Savings were 
supposed to come from the elimination of duplication and overlap. The department's 
different agencies were expected to incorporate the war on terrorism into their existing 
missions, and somehow find enough dollars and employees to add it to their already 
complicated mandates: “The budget was so small that finding funds was a constant 
preoccupation. Touted as receiving forty billion dollars, DHS received far less in new 
money. One-third of the money went to other agencies such as the Pentagon, and most 
of the other twenty-seven billion is not new money. Five of the twenty-two agencies had 
a total budget of nineteen billion dollars, which they brought with them, and this is 
counted in the forty billion dollar figure.”116
After the Congress passed the Homeland Security Act on November 19, 
President Bush issued the following statement to the nation: “The United States 
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Congress has taken an historic and bold step forward to protect the American people by 
passing legislation to create the Department of Homeland Security. This landmark 
legislation, the most extensive reorganization of the Federal Government since the 
1940s, will help our Nation meet the emerging threats of terrorism in the 21st 
Century.”117 Six days later when signing the bill into existence, the President added, 
“The continuing threat of terrorism, the threat of mass murder on our soil will be met by 
a unified, effective response.” 118
The legislation combined together some of the best (e.g. U.S. Coast Guard) and 
worst (Customs Service) agencies in the federal government.119 One of the first tasks for 
Tom Ridge as the newly appointed Secretary of Homeland Security was to organize the 
DHS. The primary functions were divided among five directorates, each headed by an 
undersecretary. Four of the directorates directly corresponded to four out of the six 
critical mission areas set forth in the National Strategy for Homeland Security. The 
following overview of the individual directorates draws on analysis undertaken by 
Philip B. Purpura and Wendy Haynes.120 In Appendix 1, it is possible to see the original 
organizational structure including the former affiliation of each agency newly 
incorporated under the DHS.
Management Directorate was established to operate several administrative 
functions in support of the DHS. These include the budget, appropriations, 
accounting, procurement, human resources, information technology, 
property, equipment, facilities, and performance evaluations.
Border and Transportation Security Directorate became the largest 
directorate, coordinating the functions of the following federal agencies:
U.S. Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service Enforcement 
Division, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Transportation 
Security Administration, Office for Domestic Preparedness, and Federal 
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Protective Service. The major goal of this directorate was the security of air, 
land, and sea borders and transportation systems. Its other tasks also 
included securing access points and preventing the entry of terrorists and 
contraband into the United States; administration and enforcement of rules 
governing entry into the United States and immigration; enforcing the 
customs laws of the United States; and improving homeland security 
communications systems.
Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate was designed to 
include the Federal Emergency Management Agency, with the goals of 
preparing for and responding to natural and technological disasters and 
terrorism. Its tasks, among others, included managing disasters in 
coordination with local and state first responders; administering the disaster 
relief fund; and emphasizing risk management to include preparedness, 
prevention, response, and recovery.
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate 
was focused on the anticipation of terrorist threats, protection of critical 
infrastructure and cyberspace, and sharing threat information. Information 
analysis tasks included identifying and assessing the nature and scope of 
terrorist threats; administering the five-color-coded Homeland Security 
Advisory System; ensuring the efficient collection and sharing of 
information within the DHS and with external partners; establishing and 
utilizing a secure and fully compatible National Security and Emergency 
Preparedness communications system; and conducting training on 
information analysis and sharing for all levels of government. The main 
infrastructure protection tasks consisted of assessing the risks of the critical 
infrastructure of the United States; planning the protection of critical 
infrastructure; providing technical assistance and crisis management support 
to the public and private sectors; and providing specific warning information 
to the public and private sectors.
Science and Technology Directorate was established to facilitate research 
and development aimed at preventing and mitigating WMD and other 
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threats. The DHS sought to use research to prevent catastrophic losses of life 
and major economic impact. Its tasks consisted of developing new vaccines, 
antidotes, diagnostics, and therapies to combat biological and chemical 
weapons; facilitating the development, testing, evaluation, and deployment 
of homeland security technologies; and awarding competitive grants to the 
public and private sectors to conduct research.
The overview above of the main tasks of the newly created DHS clearly 
demonstrates how many different roles were expected from the department to be
fulfilled. However, the department had to face a number of challenges from its creation. 
The biggest problem was a lack of organizational culture. As Howard Ball points out, 
“[u]nder the Homeland Security Act, almost 200,000 government employees, working 
in two dozen federal agencies for decades, now found themselves in the DHS but doing 
precisely the same jobs, reporting to the same congressional committees, functioning 
and being evaluated according to the norms, traditions, customs - in short, the ‘culture’ -
of their old agencies.”121 The problem is compounded because the new department did 
not have a culture, did not have norms and standards for reporting. Thus, the DHS 
employees were forced to act as if they had two masters, one being the DHS, the other 
being the agency they were accustomed to working for.
Another problem connected with the inefficient organizational culture is the 
conflict between the counterterrorism mission and the non-terrorism related tasks. 
According to Paul C. Light “[o]nly 65 percent of the Department’s budget is spent on 
programs properly defined as homeland security. The Department of Homeland 
Security includes bureaucratic pieces that do not belong in an organization designed to 
protect the nation from terrorism. It may have a mission statement, but it lacks a unified 
mission.”122 Because the Congress did not allow any budget or personal increases on top 
of the already allocated budgets of the respected agencies, savings were supposed to 
come from the elimination of duplication and overlap. As such, the department’s 
different agencies were expected to incorporate the counterterrorism measures into their 
existing missions and somehow find enough money and employees to add it to their 
already complicated mandates.
Charles Perrow concludes that the new department merged agencies that, along 
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with their security roles, had responsibilities for such activities unrelated to terrorism 
such as fisheries, river floods, animal diseases, energy reliability, computer crime, 
citizenship training, tariffs on imports, drug smuggling, and the reliability of telephone 
networks.123 Thus, the move under the homeland security umbrella was not likely to 
increase their performance, since some non-security functions (fishing rights, computer 
crime, tariffs, etc.) might have benefited from staying close to other agencies that were 
not brought in to the new department.
Moreover, the multiple and often confusing missions hampered intra-department 
cooperation. Clashing organizational cultures distracted agency managers and made it 
hard for agency officials to synchronize their operations. As Donald Kettl emphasizes, 
“no agency wanted to surrender its autonomy to others.”124
In addition to the institutional “challenge of merging 22 federal agencies into a 
single organization, the department was hampered by Congress's refusal to reorganize 
its oversight process: As a result, DHS at one point had to report to no fewer than 88 
congressional oversight committees.”125 With that many committees and sub-
committees it was virtually impossible to have directed and focused oversight. Yet these 
committees refused to reshape their jurisdictions to match all the organizational shifts 
that occurred.126
In December 2004, an independent task force charged with examining the 
organization and operations of the DHS issued a final report in which it recognized that 
“the current organization of DHS must be reformed because it hampers the Secretary of 
Homeland Security’s ability to lead our nation’s homeland security efforts. The 
organization is weighed down with bureaucratic layers, is rife with turf warfare, and 
lacks a structure for strategic thinking and policymaking. Additionally, since its 
creation, whether one looks at the department’s capacity to organize and mobilize a 
response…the department has been slow to overcome the obstacles to becoming an 
effective 21st century national security instrument.”127
The task force developed 40 major recommendations, which made a case for a 
significant reorganization of the department to make it a more effective and efficient 
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instrument for preventing and responding to terrorist threats. Some of these 
recommendations were taken into account during the review process launched by new 
Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, in 2005. This process and 
organizational change stems from this reevaluation and will be discussed next.
4.2. Re-Crafting the Department: 2nd Stage Review Reorganization
In one of his first actions as Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge’s 
successor, Michael Chertoff, announced on March 2, 2005, the day before he was sworn 
in as Secretary, in testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security that he was “initiating a comprehensive review of the department’s 
organization, operations, and policies.”128 This agenda resulted from what he called a 
Second Stage Review, or 2SR, and involved, as Chertoff said, “a systematic evaluation 
of the Department’s operations, policies and structures.”129 Indeed, as Secretary 
Chertoff explained, 2SR involved the evaluation of a variety of operational and policy 
issues, and among those was “the DHS organizational structure, to make sure that our 
organization is best aligned to support our mission.”130
The main outcome of this review was a so-called Six-point Agenda of the 
department’s reorganization in order to: (1.) Increase overall preparedness, particularly 
for catastrophic events; (2.) Create better transportation security systems to move people 
and cargo more securely and efficiently; (3.) Strengthen border security and interior 
enforcement and reform immigration processes; (4.) Enhance information sharing with 
our partners; (5.) Improve DHS financial management, human resource development, 
procurement and information technology; and (6.) Realign the DHS organization to 
maximize mission performance.131
The change in organizational structure of DHS after the 2SR can be reviewed in 
Appendix 2. One of the most significant changes that occurred as result of the 2SR was 
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an organizational restructuring of the department.132 Secretary Chertoff asserted that 
these changes are being made “to increase [the Department’s] ability to prepare, 
prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks and other emergencies.”133 As part of the 
reorganization a new Directorate of Policy was created to centralize and improve policy 
development and coordination. This directorate was to serve as the primary department-
wide coordinator for policies, regulations and other initiatives. It was created to ensure 
the consistency of policy and regulatory development across various parts of the 
department as well as to perform long-range strategic policy planning. It assumed the 
policy coordination functions previously performed by the Border and Transportation 
Security Directorate.
A new Office of Intelligence and Analysis was created to strengthen intelligence 
functions and information sharing. This office was tasked to ensure that information is 
gathered from all relevant field operations and other parts of the intelligence 
community; analyzed with a mission-oriented focus; is informative to senior decision 
makers; and disseminated to the appropriate federal, state, local, and private-sector 
partners. Led by a chief intelligence officer who reports directly to the secretary, this 
office was comprised of analysts within the former information analysis directorate and 
draw on the expertise of other DHS components with intelligence collection and 
analysis operations.134
Also, a new Director of Operations Coordination position was created to 
improve coordination and efficiency of operations. This official’s responsibilities 
include working to enable DHS to more effectively conduct joint operations across all 
organizational elements; coordinating incident management activities; and utilizing all 
resources within the department to translate intelligence and policy into immediate 
action. The Homeland Security Operations Center, which serves as the nation’s nerve 
center for information sharing and domestic incident management on a full-time basis, 
was made a critical part of this new office.
The last substantial change under the 2SR gave FEMA direct access to the 
Secretary of Homeland Security in order to improve national response and recovery 
efforts by focusing FEMA on its core functions. Under the new DHS proposed by the 
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agenda, FEMA’s main focus was targeted on response and recovery.
The next part of this chapter will focus on the information sharing and 
intelligence aspect of homeland security.
4.3. Homeland Security Intelligence
“Information must be fully shared, so we can follow every lead,”135 said 
President Bush in his June 6, 2002 address. One of the DHS’s four directorates, the 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP) and after 2SR the 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis were intended to fulfill one of the most critical 
homeland security functions – to improve the intelligence sharing and dissemination of 
information. They were tasked with coordinating and analyzing intelligence information 
about terrorist threats to the United States, assessing vulnerabilities to U.S. 
infrastructure, and disseminating information to the private sector and to relevant 
federal, state, and local officials. The IAIP was to “fuse and analyze intelligence and 
other information pertaining to threats to the homeland from multiple sources –
including the CIA, NSA, FBI, INS, DEA, DOE, Customs, DOT and data gleaned from 
other organizations.”136
In June 2002, the former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet 
testified before the Government Affairs Subcommittee that while there was a foreign 
intelligence community and numerous law enforcement agencies, a cohesive body never 
existed that was solely responsible for homeland security. In discussing the eventual 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Tenet proclaimed that DHS 
would not duplicate the roles of foreign intelligence or law enforcement, but would 
rather “merge under one roof the capability to assess threats to the homeland, map those 
threats against our vulnerabilities, and take action to protect America’s key assets and 
critical infrastructure.”137 Significantly, he stated that DHS would review intelligence 
and “provide and develop an action plan to counter the threat.”138 He explained that, by 
making security enhancements to infrastructure, the costs and risks for terrorists to 
operate in the United States would increase. He further elaborated that the Central 
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Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) counterterrorism mission for years had “been to understand 
and reduce the threat.”139 DHS’s new mission, in contrast, would be to “understand and 
reduce the nation’s domestic vulnerability.”140
Nevertheless, the original support for DHS’s intelligence role quickly withered. 
In a rather surprising move, President Bush circumvented the newly established DHS’s 
intelligence directorate and proposed an establishment of a new Terrorist Threat 
Integration Center (TTIC) in January 2003.141 The TTIC was created under the Director 
of Central Intelligence (DCI), to coordinate and provide comprehensive analysis to the 
president and federal agencies on terrorist threats – the very task originally envisioned 
for the DHS.
The TTIC was designed to integrate and analyze all terrorist threat information 
collected domestically and abroad and to design a database of known and suspected 
terrorists that could be accessed by federal, state, and local officials across the United 
States. It was also focused on examining regional threats, such as Middle Eastern 
terrorist organizations, as well as functional threats, such as WMD and cyber attacks. It 
was staffed by representatives from the CIA, FBI, DHS, and other bodies from the 
Departments of Defense and State such as the NSA, NGA, and Defense Intelligence 
Agency. Even though, it was legally not part of the CIA (officially it reported to the 
DCI), in practice the distinction was much less clear as the CIA effectively controlled 
its functions – it was placed under the CIA’s budget and was located at CIA 
headquarters.142
Although created to improve coordination and sharing, the TTIC has caused 
confusion within the federal government about the respective roles of the TTIC and the 
DHS. Its creation duplicated functions of the IAIP and greatly undermined its mandate.
According to Stephanie Cooper Blum, the newly created department had to face 
three major problems with regards to intelligence and information sharing: (1.) lack of 
respect and resources; (2.) a decision not to give DHS access to raw intelligence; a and 
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(3.) competition and potential overlap in mission with the TTIC.143 As Cooper Blum 
points out four months after DHS’s creation, the IAIP — the intelligence unit of DHS 
— was “understaffed, unorganized and weak-willed in bureaucratic struggles with other 
government agencies.”144 Moreover, DHS was competing for intelligence professionals 
with the higher-profile FBI, CIA, and TTIC.145
Another problem was the impossibility to access raw intelligence. When 
Congress created the DHS in 2002, it did not transfer to the new agency existing 
government intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Rather, Congress sought an 
analytical office that would use the products from other agencies such as the FBI and 
CIA to provide necessary warning of terrorist attacks; conduct vulnerability assessments 
of key resources and infrastructure; and make recommendations for remedial actions at 
the federal, state, and local levels as well as to the private sector. Thus, DHS had neither 
the power to collect intelligence nor any tasking authority over other agencies. Rather 
than integrating the CIA, FBI and other agencies, the IAIP had to beg to obtain 
information from them.146 Both the CIA and the FBI strongly resisted handing over 
significant power to DHS. And both agencies increased, rather than decreased their 
homeland security functions. According to Seth Jones, “White House and congressional 
support for DHS faded quickly. Most policymakers believed either that DHS was 
unable to perform terrorist threat analysis adequately, or that other departments within 
the federal government could do it better.”147 And Richard Bets adds that it was 
concerns that DHS was a “new and untested agency” tasked with producing all-source 
intelligence led to the Bush administration deciding that DHS would not be given raw 
intelligence from the CIA and the FBI.148
Therefore the responsibility for coordinating intelligence sharing and evaluation 
was given to the TTIC, which became operational in May 2003. It was a multiagency 
entity with “access to information systems and databases spanning the intelligence, law 
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enforcement, homeland security, diplomatic, and military communities that contain 
information related to the threat of international terrorism.”149
The Congress explained the seemingly competing and duplicating missions of 
the IAIP and the TTIC in a following way. While the TTIC had the primary 
responsibility for terrorism analyses (unless solely domestic), the IAIP had primary 
responsibility for “matching the assessment of the risk posed by identified threats and 
terrorist capabilities to our Nation’s vulnerabilities.”150  Furthermore, the IAIP, along 
with the FBI, had significant responsibilities for purely domestic terrorism.
After the enforcement of the 2SR six-point agenda and reorganization of the 
IAIP to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), there has been a partial 
improvement of some the above-mentioned deficiencies. As Michael Studeman 
explains, the I&A is now a “full member of the Intelligence Community (IC), with a 
budget in the millions and more than 500 employees spread over seven divisions.”151 In 
essence I&A manages the collection, analysis, and fusion of intelligence for DHS. Yet, 
that is still quite far from the originally proposed task of one agency responsible for all 
aspects of intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination.
4.4. Conclusion
In the words of President Bush, the main reason for creation of the Department 
of Homeland Security was “to increase focus and effectiveness.”152 Yet, as was 
manifested in this chapter, the new department struggled to address its mission and 
adopt a unified organizational culture. With regards to the intelligence sharing aspect of 
homeland security, DHS’s role was hampered by the President’s proposal of a new 
intelligence agency, the TTIC, which was charged with essentially the same 
responsibilities as those circumscribed for DHS’s IAIP. Moreover, the relationship 
between the IAIP and the remaining agencies in the U.S. intelligence community were 
based on competition, rather than cooperation.
It is therefore possible to say, that in the first years after the creation of DHS, the 
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homeland security and counterterrorist agenda was less unified than before 9/11. In the 
next chapter, some of the main processes of U.S. intelligence community reform will be 
introduced in order to examine the impact of the reform on improvement of information 
and intelligence sharing after 9/11. 
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5. Reforming the Intelligence Community
After the first shock from 9/11 passed over, a wide-ranging debate was 
prompted over the role of intelligence in failing to recognize the threat and prevent the 
terrorist attacks. Two commissions were established to investigate the failure. First was 
the Joint Inquiry conducted by the U.S. House Permanent Select Intelligence and the 
Senate Select Intelligence Committees and second was the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (The 9/11 Commission). The conclusions and 
recommendations of these committees pointed out some of the essential weaknesses 
within the intelligence community and became an important starting point for 
subsequent intelligence community reform embedded in the adoption of the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). 
This chapter will first focus on the main findings of the Joint Inquiry and the 
9/11 Commission. Thereafter, there will be an examination of the process of adopting 
the IRTPA. The legislative debate that accompanied its enactment and its major 
provisions will be introduced. Then, the actual impact of the IRTPA on the intelligence 
community will be evaluated, both in terms of the newly created institutions – the DNI 
and the NCTC, as well as from the point of view of the old institutions – the FBI and the 
CIA.
The analysis and evaluation of the 9/11 Commission recommendations can serve 
as an input factor to the evaluation of the final outcome of the U.S. government 
homeland security reorganization, while the interpretation of the implementation and 
the consequent character of the intelligence community after the enactment of the 
IRTPA can be interpreted as the output perspective of the input-output methodological 
model (see Figure 1.1) examining the efficiency of the U.S. government reorganization 
post-9/11.
5.1. Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission Findings and Recommendations
Shortly after 9/11, questions concerning the failure of intelligence to avert the 
terrorist attacks were raised. There was pressure to find out what had led to the attacks 
and who was responsible. First, the U.S. House Permanent Select Intelligence and the 
Senate Select Intelligence Committees established a Joint Inquiry with three principal 
goals: (1) to conduct a factual review of what the U.S. intelligence community knew or 
should have known prior to 9/11, regarding the international terrorist threat to the 
United States, to include the scope and nature of any possible international terrorist 
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attacks against the United States and its interests; (2) to identify and examine any 
systemic problems that may have impeded the Intelligence Community in learning of or 
preventing these attacks in advance; and (3) to make recommendations to improve the 
Intelligence Community’s ability to identify and prevent future international terrorist 
attacks.153
Among the main findings of the Joint Inquiry was that “prior to 9/11, the 
intelligence community was neither well-organized, nor well-equipped, and did not 
adequately adapt to meet the challenge posed by global terrorists focused on targets 
within the domestic United States. Serious gaps existed between the collection coverage 
provided by U.S. foreign and domestic intelligence capabilities.”154 Put simply, as the 
Joint Inquiry recognized, the intelligence community was not properly organized for a 
transnational threat such as al Qaeda.
Other findings included: (1) the lack of a comprehensive counterterrorist 
strategy both on governmental as well as intelligence level; (2) inefficiencies in the 
allocation of resources and problematic intelligence community budgeting practices and 
procedures; (3) inefficient use of new technology and reliance on outdated technologies, 
thus having a negative impact on collaboration between the intelligence community 
agencies as well as their adaption to the nature of the terrorist threats; (4) lack of 
incentives for analytical positions, which were seen as dead-end jobs in the community 
and which led to analytic deficiencies, thus seriously undercutting the ability of U.S. 
policymakers to understand the full nature of the threat; (5) lack of information sharing 
not only between intelligence community agencies, but also within individual agencies, 
and between the intelligence and the law enforcement agencies, and also between 
intelligence community and relevant non-intelligence community agencies, such as law 
enforcement and border protection; (6) lack of reliable and knowledgeable human 
sources; (7) lengthy and perilous application process for Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) surveillance leading to a diminished level of FBI coverage of 
suspected al Qaeda operatives in the United States; (8) lack of strategy to track terrorist 
funding and close down their financial support networks.155
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In its final report, the Joint Inquiry proposed nineteen recommendations, which 
included establishing a powerful new director of national intelligence, revamping the 
intelligence priority process, and considering whether new domestic intelligence agency 
should replace the FBI. However, as M. Kent Bolton contends, the Joint Inquiry’s 
thorough work – it studied some one million documents and interviewed some 500 
persons – “raised more questions than it answered; it thereby provided an impetus for 
subsequent postmortems.”156 This succeeding task was undergone by the 9/11 
Commission, the mother of all postmortems.
The 9/11 Commission built on the findings of the Joint Inquiry and added some 
more insights stemming from 1200 interviews and 2.5 million pages of various 
documents. The 9/11 Commission took the reshaping of the U.S. intelligence into a new 
level. Gregory Treverton points out that “its report was dramatic and made several 
recommendations – primarily to reshape the organization of U.S. intelligence but also to 
begin to change the way it does business.”157
Regarding intelligence and information sharing, the 9/11 Commission identified 
six problems, which created the need to restructure intelligence: (1) structural barriers to 
performing joint intelligence work – the problem of organizing national intelligence 
around collection disciplines of the home agencies, not the joint mission; (2) lack of 
common standards and practices across the foreign-domestic divide that created the 
inability to pool information gathered abroad with information gathered in the United 
States; (3) divided management of national intelligence capabilities, which limited 
influence of the DCI over the three intelligence agencies housed within the Department 
of Defense (the NSA, the NGA, and the NRO); (4) weak capacity of the DCI to set 
priorities and move resources; (5) too many tasks carried out by the DCI – the fact that 
DCI had three jobs as head of the community, principal adviser to the president on 
intelligence matters, and head of the CIA combined with his weak authorities even 
limited his managerial abilities; (6) too complex and secret nature of intelligence 
community, which made public comprehension of the intelligence agencies and the 
rules surrounding them impossible.158
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Subsequently, the 9/11 Commission recognized the fact that even though the 
DCI was responsible for community performance, it lacked three authorities critical for 
any agency head or chief executive officer: control over purse strings, the ability to hire 
or fire senior managers, and the ability to set standards for the information infrastructure 
and personnel.159 In order to address these problems the 9/11 Commission made six 
broad proposals, which underscored the need not only to create the technical 
infrastructure to better share intelligence but also to rethink the perspective of “need-to-
know” and other security requirements that frustrated sharing. The 9/11 principal 
recommendations were to160:
 Create the position of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), located in 
the White House and possessing real authority over the budgets of the fifteen 
U.S. intelligence agencies
 Institute a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) reporting to the DNI, 
responsible for both joint operational planning and joint intelligence
 Establish national intelligence centers, organized around discrete issues on 
the model of the NCTC, under the authority of the DNI
 Make the CIA director a position separate from the DNI and charge him 
primarily with building better espionage capacity for the nation
 Rethink the web of “need-to know” and other security procedures that 
frustrate not just sharing but also intelligence work as whole
 Not to create a separate domestic-intelligence service, instead to encourage 
the FBI to move forward with changing its mission from pure law 
enforcement to terrorism prevention 
The Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission findings and recommendations greatly 
remind the proposals of the pre-9/11 commissions and task forces. Therefore, it is 
possible to see some consistency in the pre- and post-9/11 attempts to reform the U.S. 
intelligence community. As chapter 2 showed, the pre-9/11 attempts were generally 
ignored by the decision-makers and resisted by the intelligence agencies themselves. 
The general idea behind the 9/11 Commission reform proposal was that after 9/11 the 
incentives for adoption of the reform have changed and it was therefore possible to 
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usher in a sweeping reform of the U.S. intelligence community. The next sub-chapter 
will address this assumption. 
5.2. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
The 9/11 Commission final report was issued in July 2004 and was followed by 
an immediate congressional response. Throughout the course of its work, the 9/11 
Commission received extensive media coverage, which gave rise to public pressure on 
the Congress to act on the recommendations. Also, a significant lobby was set up 
around the 9/11 victim families pushing for the implementations of the 9/11 
Commission’s recommendations. These forces speeded up the legislative process and 
both the Senate and the House began to draft implementing legislation.
5.2.1. Intelligence Reform Legislative Process Background
Both versions of bill focused mainly on the two central recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission: the establishment of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and 
creation of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The original DNI proposal 
suggested authorities for the individual to oversee all-source national intelligence 
centers, serve as the president’s principal intelligence advisor, manage the national 
intelligence program, and oversee the component agencies of the intelligence 
community. Included in his powers were supposed to be the responsibility for 
submitting a unified intelligence budget, appropriating fund to the intelligence agencies, 
and setting personnel policies for the intelligence community.161
The NCTC recommendation was designed to address the intelligence 
community’s structural problems, particularly the lack of an appropriate entity for 
performing executive branch–wide counterterrorism operational planning. It was 
supposed to be a center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence staffed by 
personnel from the various agencies. Its focus was envisaged to be on counterterrorism 
and it was supposed to have responsibility for integrating the intelligence agencies’ 
capabilities against terrorism. Its aim was to be the preeminent body for analyzing 
terrorism and assessing the terrorist threat.162
The Senate bill followed the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations more closely, 
while the House bill provided for a far less powerful director. The House bill covered a 
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wide range of counterterrorism issues, including immigration and criminal penalties. 
Glenn Hastedt summed up the differences between the bills: “Under the Senate bill, the 
CIA director ‘shall’ be under the authority, direction, and control’ of the national 
intelligence director. In the House version, the CIA director would only ‘report’ to the 
National Intelligence Director. The House bill also only gave the National Intelligence 
Director the power to develop budgets and give ‘guidance’ to intelligence community 
members. The Senate bill stated that he or she would ‘determine’ the budget. The 
Senate bill would also make the intelligence budget public, require that most of the 
Director’s high-ranking assistants be confirmed by the Senate, and create a civil 
liberties panel to prevent privacy abuses.”163
The main opposition against the bill came from the House Republicans led by 
the chair of House Armed Services Committee, Duncan Hunter. Essentially, Hunter was 
a protégé of the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, in Congress. Similar to 
previous attempts to reform the intelligence community, Department of Defense 
officials, now led by Rumsfeld, strongly opposed any proposals changing the structure 
and streamlining the intelligence community. These changes were traditionally 
perceived by Pentagon as a threat to its control over defense intelligence agencies and 
over the vast share of the intelligence budget. Thus, the Defense Department leadership 
tried to discredit the reform by all means, both privately during classified hearings, and 
publicly when General Richard Meyers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, delivered 
a bombshell letter to the House Armed Services Committee. “In the letter, Meyers 
opposed giving the proposed director of national intelligence strong budgetary 
authorities over intelligence agencies housed in the Pentagon arguing that only a 
Pentagon-controlled budget would ensure sufficient ‘support to the warfighters’.”164
Moreover, the presidential support to the Senate version of the bill remained 
lukewarm.165 At a time of ongoing War on Terror operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
the President did nothing to stop the Defense Department lobby. He simply avoided 
fighting his own Department of Defense over intelligence reform at war time. 
According to Michael Turner, “President Bush had to look like he was pushing the bill 
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but would in fact prefer to see the proposal die”.166 And that is why he, at the end, 
recommended the passage of a bill that conformed to the House version, establishing a 
weak DNI and keeping the Defense Department in charge of its intelligence agencies. 
The final bill was adopted 89-2 in the Senate and 336-75 in the House.167 The president 
then signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 on 
December 17, 2004.
5.2.2. Major Provisions of the IRTPA
The IRTPA was divided into eight titles:168 (I) Reform of the Intelligence 
Community; (II) Federal Bureau of Investigation; (III) Security Clearances; (IV) 
Transportation Security (V) Border Protection, Immigration, and Visa Matters; (VI) 
Terrorism Prevention; (VII) Implementation of the 9/11 Commission 
Recommendations; (VIII) Other Matters. 
Under Article I, the IRTPA created a Senate confirmed DNI separate from the 
CIA director, responsible for leading the intelligence community and for serving as 
principal adviser to the president, the National Security Council and the Homeland 
Security Council. The DNI was given several important authorities and 
responsibilities.169 They included determining the intelligence budget170, managing the 
execution of the intelligence appropriation, transferring funds and personnel, and hiring 
senior officials. 
The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has been made responsible for 
integrating the intelligence agencies’ capabilities, designing preeminent 
counterterrorism analysis and proposing collection requirements to the DNI to guide the 
agencies’ collection activities. The NCTC’s other function established under the IRTPA 
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was to engage in planning for counterterrorism operations across the executive branch. 
However, the actual description of the planning work has remained fairly vague in the 
IRTPA, because “it existed in a gray area between high-level strategy and detailed, 
tactical planning”.171
Other provisions of the IRTPA focused on the problem of improving the 
domestic intelligence capabilities of the FBI (Title II). The IRTPA directed specific 
instructions for the FBI to change fundamentally the FBI’s orientation and culture. The 
Director of the FBI was ordered “to develop and maintain a specialized and integrated 
national intelligence workforce consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance 
specialists who are recruited, trained, and rewarded in a manner which ensures the 
existence within the Federal Bureau of Investigation an institutional culture with 
substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the intelligence mission of the Bureau.”172
Moreover, the IRTPA paid vast attention to provisions concerning homeland 
security and improving the counterterrorism prevention as well as response. The 
provisions under Title VI (Terrorism Prevention) were aimed at enhancing the ability of 
the DHS to stop terrorists before they reach the U. S. borders, and to stop money-
laundering practices that support terrorism. Other sections and titles were also devoted 
to transportation security and border protection, thus stretching the overall reach of the 
IRTPA.
In summary, the 9/11 Commission was one of the very few commissions to ever 
see its recommendations successfully codified into law. However, the IRTPA’s actual 
impact was mitigated by the ambiguity of its language. The vagueness of the legislation 
was a product of the congressional compromise and strong Defense Department lobby 
protecting its “turf”. Even thought the adoption of the IRTPA improved the situation of 
central management of the U.S. intelligence community, it did not vest enough 
authorities to the DNI to be able to overcome the obstructions to the intelligence 
community reform from both the agencies themselves, as well as from the DOD 
leadership. The actual development of the establishment and functions of the new 
agencies with the intelligence community, the DNI and the NCTC, as well as the impact 
of the IRTPA on the old agencies, the FBI and the CIA, will be examined and evaluated 
in the following subchapters.
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5.3. Intelligence Community after the Reform Act
This subchapter will focus on evaluation of the newly established institutions in 
the IRTPA, the DNI and the NCTC. The key question is whether their creation 
essentially led to better efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence 
community’s counterterrorism mission.
5.3.1. Director of National Intelligence
According to Gordon Lederman, “the Executive Branch’s implementation of the 
2004 act began without the necessary vigor.”173 The first DNI, Ambassador John 
Negroponte, was an accomplished diplomat and policymaker, but he lacked working 
knowledge of the U.S. intelligence community and substantial experience in leading and 
transforming large organizations.
One of the major problems of implementing the IRTPA is that the legislation 
was giving the DNI considerable responsibility but not enough power and authority 
especially when faced with Defense Department resistance. Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld successfully pushed for establishment of the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Intelligence, “which was widely viewed as an attempt to block the DNI’s effort to gain 
effective authority over DOD intelligence functions.”174 All Defense Department 
intelligence agencies were made subordinate to this new Director of Military 
intelligence-like position. Thus, the DNI’s actual power over the DOD agencies has 
remained quite limited.
In 2006, Ambassador Negroponte resigned from the position of the DNI and was 
replaced by seemingly much better fit for the position, retired Admiral Mike 
McConnell. Former NSA director with decades of experience in U.S. intelligence was 
confirmed in January 2007. DNI McConnell began his tenure by issuing a 100-day plan, 
followed by a 500-day plan for the intelligence community. Both of the plans focused 
on better management and provided “an intellectual structure for considering 
intelligence reform more methodically.”175 Even though the change on the working 
level remained limited,176 the rhetoric and McConnell’s approach to the DNI’s position 
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certainly led to a better sense of corporateness and leadership within the intelligence 
community.
In addition, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was succeeded by Robert 
Gates, a former DCI in December 2006, which subsequently led to easing of tension and 
improved relationship between the DNI and the Defense Department during the final 
months of the Bush administration. Unfortunately, some other serious problems 
remained, especially on the level of coordination and oversight of the old agencies and 
within the newly created NCTC such as deficiencies regarding security clearances and 
personnel management.
5.3.2. National Counterterrorism Center
The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was created to give boost to 
information sharing and analysis. It has taken over and expanded the TTIC’s mission 
and became a hub for analyzing terrorism-related intelligence across the community. 
The NCTC was presented as the most successful improvement of the intelligence 
community – the grand jewel of intelligence reform. Different agency officials were 
supposed to sit in one room and draft collective analysis on terrorist threats. The IRTPA 
“in order to promote and facilitate rotations to the new center, required rotational 
assignments for promotion within the intelligence community, and created specific 
incentives for service in national intelligence centers.”177
However, even if the rules allow it, organizational barriers still block 
information sharing. According to Amy Zegart, “because NCTC’s analysts have varying 
levels of security clearances and come from different agencies, they still see different 
pieces of information.”178 Arthur Hulnick also points out that “CIA security officials did 
not accept the clearances of officers from other agencies without doing their own 
security checks, and that even a CIA officer had to get a new clearance because he 
would be using a different computer system than the one for which he already had 
access.”179 This kind of bureaucratic pathology is very baffling given the amount of 
criticism and pressure for improvement was imposed on information sharing after 9/11. 
In December 2005, the 9/11 Commission’s Public Discourse Project issued a report card 
assessing implementation of its recommendations. Information sharing efforts received 
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a grade D.180 Two years later, one intelligence officer offered a similarly discouraging 
progress report and underscored that “most of the sharing issues we face are cultural and 
process rather than technology.”181 However, the technological problems should not be 
overlooked as the agencies’ intelligence databases use different software mostly 
incompatible with each other.
Moreover, according to Zegart, “most U.S. intelligence agencies have no 
experience conducting all-source analysis, so the personnel they assign to the NCTC is 
learning on the job.”182 However, with inexperienced analyst and obstructions to their 
actual work, the quality of analysis is hampered. Also, within the respected agencies, 
rotational assignments are not promoted as they should be. They are still seen more as a 
necessary evil than as a prestigious mission to which the brightest analysts should be 
nominated. And once part of the NCTC the analysts continue their loyalty to their 
parent agencies rather than to the NCTC mission itself.183
The idea of rotational assignments was one of the key initiatives in transforming 
the intelligence community into – in President Bush’s words – a single, unified 
enterprise.184 In order to accomplish this task creation of a notion of jointness was 
required.185 However, the process of joint duty has been largely circumvented by 
intelligence professionals. But as Patrick Neary concludes, “joint duty is a means to an 
end: a change in the community’s culture that emphasizes enterprise mission 
accomplishment over agency performance. It is unclear how that change will occur 
without a significant change in the assignment patterns of our professional 
workforce.”186
To sum up, evaluating performance of the newly created agencies clearly shows 
that deficiencies pertain. The key problem is the inability of the DNI to overcome the 
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cultural patterns embedded in the U.S. intelligence community’s institutional 
environment. These obstacles than make it difficult for the DNI, already weakened by 
some of the provisions of the IRTPA not granting him enough authority, to fully 
coordinate the intelligence community into a unified enterprise efficient and effective in 
countering the terrorist threats. While for the new institutions the problem lays in the 
inability to coordinate, for the old institutions, such as the FBI and the CIA, as will be 
shown in the last part of this chapter, the problem is in adaptation. Nevertheless, the 
main obstacles to the reform for both are deeply rooted in the organizational structure, 
culture and practices.
5.4. FBI’s and CIA’s Internal Attempts to Implement Reform
Due to the severe criticism for being insufficiently proactive before 9/11, the 
FBI has set forth ambitious changes in order to redefine itself from an agency that 
investigates crimes after they occur to one that is proactive in gathering intelligence 
before attacks occur. Since 2001, it has adopted a preemptive strategy, increased its 
counterterrorism resources, and established an Office of Intelligence. It is important to 
note that these actions were motivated in part by FBI’s desire to remain the lead 
counterterrorism agency for homeland threats as voices calling for creation of 
completely new domestic intelligence agency and or creating a domestic intelligence 
element within the DHS sprung during the post-9/11 discussions.
According to Seth Jones, “FBI Director Robert Mueller tried to change the FBI’s 
traditional system of decentralized management, in which significant power was in the 
hands of the 56 field offices, by increasing the number and importance of analysts and 
policymakers at headquarters. He implemented a major reorganization and increased 
resources for the Counterterrorism Division. More than 500 field agents were 
permanently shifted from criminal investigations to counterterrorism.”187
Moreover, an Operations Center was established to serve as a clearinghouse for 
information sharing and collaboration. Also 66 new Joint Terrorism Task Forces across 
the country were created, which included state and local law enforcement officers, and 
FBI agents. The FBI also bolstered its analytical capabilities by creating an Executive 
Assistant Director for Intelligence and an Office of Intelligence. The office was 
responsible for identifying emerging threats and crime problems that impact FBI 
investigations and overall strategies. It was the FBI’s primary interface for coordinating 
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intelligence on terrorist threats to the United States and sharing information with the 
U.S. intelligence community, the legislative branch, foreign government agencies, state 
and local law enforcement, and the private sector. Each FBI field office was also put 
under a Field Intelligence Group to centrally manage, execute, and coordinate the FBI’s 
intelligence functions in that field office.188
Despite these major changes, the law enforcement organizational culture largely 
prevails. Most problematic is the position of analysts within the FBI structure. 
According to Arthur Hulnick, “analysts were recruited or borrowed, primarily from 
other intelligence analytic units, but soon found that they were second-class citizens in a 
system that valued the Special Agents more than the analysts.”189 The FBI’s own 
guidelines divide its employees to only two groups Special Agents and “other support 
professionals”, thus putting analysts into a same group with cleaning people or truck 
drivers.190 Amy Zegart also refers to this problem contending that “the bureau rules still 
mandate that senior positions in the field, including the top spot in every U.S. field 
office, be staffed by FBI special agents.”191 These provisions essentially preclude any 
career moves for the FBI analysts.
Efforts to improve the FBI’s obsolete technology systems have also been 
unsuccessful and very costly. After two attempts to acquire a technology modernization 
program, the FBI still does not have a modern and effective case management record 
system.192
Even though that the FBI has attempted the most ambitious changes, the results 
are disappointing and greatly inefficient given the amount of attention and resources 
allocated to consolidate its domestic intelligence and counterterrorism mission. It seems 
that most of the proposed changes have been unable to break the law enforcement way 
of thinking within the agency, despite the fact that its official mission has been restated 
to protect and defend the United States against terrorism and foreign intelligence threats 
first, and to uphold and enforce the criminal laws second.
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The CIA has not adapted well to the post-9/11 changes either. For most of the 
time, it has been an agency in turmoil. Due to numerous scandals both of its foreign 
operations (the black sites scandal193) as well as its leadership (Porter J. Goss 
scandal194), the morale has been on a low. The IRTPA ordered the Director of Central 
Intelligence Agency to rebuild CIA’s analytical capabilities, transform the clandestine 
services by building its human intelligence capabilities, develop a stronger language 
program, with high standards and sufficient financial incentives, emphasize recruiting 
diversity among operation officers so they can blend more easily in foreign cities, and to 
ensure a seamless relationship between human source collection and signals collection 
at the operational level. It has also “instructed the CIA and the Department of Defense 
to work better together in coordinating their respective intelligence domains.”195
The CIA has attempted to increase its domestic intelligence powers first through 
its Counterterrorist Center and then through the TTIC, which was placed under the 
CIA’s budget and headquarters. Even when the independent NCTC was created, the 
CIA provided its analysts but focused more on protecting its own turf by not sharing all 
of its information, which was explained by differences in clearances. 
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5.5. Conclusion
The evolution of the U.S. intelligence reform after 9/11 clearly shows that even 
though attempts to substantially reform the U.S. intelligence community into a single 
united enterprise with the aim and strategy of fighting transnational terrorist threats 
were made, real change has not to date reached the standard that was originally 
envisaged. Such an outcome is surprising given the strong public reaction to the events 
of 9/11 and the enthusiasm the legislative and executive branches of government 
exhibited for improving intelligence gathering and coordination. The evidence presented 
in this chapter points to a number of reasons for the failure of reform of the intelligence 
community to match expectations. 
The legislative negotiations surrounding the IRTPA bill were strongly 
influenced by a robust Defense Department lobby and combined with only lukewarm 
attention from President Bush resulted in adoption of a very vague and ambiguous piece 
of legislation. On paper, the newly created DNI has many responsibilities as well as 
authorities. However, the actual powers are much less significant and have not enabled 
the DNI to overpower the Department of Defense or overcome resistance to reform 
within the old intelligence agencies. Thus, the DNI’s ability to coordinate the U.S. 
intelligence community has been impaired. Moreover, the burgeoning size of the Office 
of the DNI has raised questions about unnecessary levels of bureaucratic layering, 
which is not helping attempts to building a more efficient intelligence community. 
Another important factor in explaining the limited success of the reform agenda 
is the organizational culture of the old intelligence agencies, the FBI and the CIA. Their 
debilitating sense of agency parochialism, a belief in the overriding importance of 
security, and the “need-to-know” principle of secrecy makes them extremely resistant to 
change even amid a crisis on the scale of 9/11. 
Moreover, from the homeland security point of view, it is possible to conclude 
that IRTPA did not substantially strengthen DHS’s own analysis division, it has only 
fully incorporated it in the U.S. intelligence community. Yet, the Office of Information 
and Analysis has to wait to receive intelligence information from the DNI and his 
office. As Howard Ball concludes, the result is that “the DHS, charged with protecting 
the homeland from terrorist strikes still has to rely on the generosity of intelligence 
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gathering agencies, totally outside the control of the Secretary of Homeland 
Security.”196
In the final chapter the major shortcomings of the homeland security and 
information sharing agenda will be analyzed. 
                                               
196 Ball, Howard. 2006, p. 58.
- 76 -
6. Is a Unified Homeland Security a Realistic Strategy?
The question in the title of this thesis asks whether U.S. homeland security is a 
reality or myth. The answer to this question is not straightforward. By the end of George 
W. Bush’s second term, homeland security agenda was fully settled in the minds of 
American citizens. Homeland security and its essentiality for countering terrorist threats 
were greatly promoted by President Bush and members of his cabinet. Thus, in this 
sense it is possible to talk about homeland security as a reality embedded both in the 
U.S. government system as well as in the U.S. public’s perceptions. Yet, looking at the 
actual design of homeland security, which was proposed to create a unified system of 
domestic counterterrorism measures based on information sharing, it is possible to say 
that the system still has flaws and can be regarded more as a myth. Stephen E. Flynn, a 
renowned national security scholar, points out that “despite the rhetoric of the past 
years, when it comes to reducing America’s exposure to the threat and consequences of 
terrorism within U.S. borders, there is not much ‘there’ there, behind the homeland 
security curtain.”197
This chapter will provide the final analysis of why, despite the proclaimed 
efforts of the Bush administration to create a unified and efficient homeland security 
system able to protect the United States against the dangers of terrorism, there is more 
of “a flimsy façade of homeland security, behind which lies a deeply flawed strategy, a 
badly broken Department of Homeland Security, and a nation that remains dangerously 
unprepared to respond to catastrophic events.”198 The last part of this chapter will then 
briefly focus on the transition between the Bush and Obama administrations with 
regards to homeland security. The evaluation and analysis of the efficiency of the U.S. 
government since 9/11 provided in this chapter also serves as the output perspective of 
the methodological model (Figure 1.1).
6.1. U.S. Homeland Security: Neither Unified Nor Efficient
One of the main problems of the bureaucratic failure of homeland security is the 
fact that “the Bush administration was never seriously invested in making DHS an 
operational success.”199 After 9/11, the Bush administration focused mostly on 
countering terrorism abroad, first in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. As President Bush 
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often mentioned, “we fight the terrorists overseas, so that we do not have to fight them 
here at home.” 200 The Bush White House did not have many incentives to manage the 
complex and politically messy interagency issues that were part of the homeland 
security agenda. 
At the operational level, the difficulties of unifying such a vast array of federal 
agencies provoked constant turf battles among powerful bureaucracies. The new focus 
on homeland security and the difficulties of merging twenty-two separate agencies 
inside the new department inevitably created new tensions between the agencies’ 
traditional missions and the new homeland security mission overlaid on top.201
Moreover, left largely untouched was the biggest problem that the 9/11 attacks 
revealed – the great difficulty the U.S. intelligence services, especially the CIA and the 
FBI, had in sharing and digesting collected intelligence. And yet, the one option not on 
the table when discussing homeland security was bringing the two agencies into the new 
department, which was vested the responsibility for connecting all the dots.202
The difficulty of defining the department’s mission and boundaries and the 
difficulty of coordinating intelligence (as discussed in chapters 4 and 5) provide the 
powerful evidence for the two main reasons the homeland security system is flawed –
organizational problems and lack of political leadership stemming from rational choices 
made by decision makers, i.e. the President and the Congress.
One of the incentives the Bush administration had for proposing and promoting 
the homeland security agenda was the idea of the new Department of Homeland 
Security as a symbol to reassure the American public it can be safe again. However, an 
issue of continual trade-offs between protection from risks and limits on freedom arose. 
More on this issue will be discussed in the next part of this chapter.
6.2. The Myth of Absolute Security
As Johnson and Tierney argue, people wildly overestimate the risk of being 
threatened by terrorism. Images of terrifying but highly unusual catastrophes on 
television – such as the World Trade Center collapsing – are far more memorable than 
images of more mundane and more prevalent threats, like dying in car crashes.203 As a 
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result of this psychological bias, large numbers of Americans have overestimated the 
probability of future terrorist strikes.204 This public anxiety was the central reason for 
both the creation of DHS and its subsequent emphasis on prevention measures.
“If the public's response is based on irrational, emotional fears, it may be 
reasonable for the government to do things that make us feel better, even if those don't 
make us safer in a rational sense, because if they feel better, people will fly on planes 
and behave in a way that's good for the economy.”205 But the psychological impact of 
DHS needs to be compared with the actual spending. Since 9/11 the homeland security 
spending more than quadrupled (see Appendix 3 for details). The problem, according to 
Jeffrey Rosen, is that even as DHS seeks to tamp down public fears with expensive and 
often wasteful preventive measures, it may also be encouraging those fears – which, in 
turn, creates ever more public demand for spending on prevention.
However, a number of scholars and former intelligence professionals argue that 
it is impossible to prevent surprise attacks. The very nature of surprise attacks is 
uncertainty caused by asymmetry of attacker and victim. As Richard Posner, one of the 
main proponents of this theory points out, “the attacker picks the time, place, and means 
of attack. Since without a great deal of luck his plan cannot be discovered in advance by 
the victim, the attacker has, by virtue of his having the initiative and of the victim’s 
being unable to be strong everywhere all the time, a built-in advantage that assures a 
reasonable probability of a local successes.”206 Therefore, the character of the attacks 
makes it extremely difficult to prevent them. As Posner continues, “even the best 
intelligence service is bound to be surprised from time to time because the only way to 
ensure against ever being surprised is to ignore the cost of false alarm and as a result 
bombard action-level officials with dire warnings.”207 Furthermore, preventing surprise 
attacks is virtually impossible either due to lack of information or an excess of data. 
Richard K. Betts warns that “in attack warning, there is the problem of ‘noise’ and 
deception.”208 He points to an overload of high volume of analysis, reports, statistics, 
which are exceeding the capacity of officials to absorb them or scrutinize them. 
                                               
204 Rosen, Jeffrey. 2008.
205 Ibid.
206 Posner Richard A. 2005. Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform at the Wake of 9/11. 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. p. 96.
207 Ibid., p. 136.
208 Betts, Richard K. 1978. “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable”. 
World Politics 31 (1): 75.
- 79 -
It is because of this impossibility of absolute prevention of surprise attacks, 
Stephen Flynn argues, that “the government should not promise more than it can 
deliver. U.S. officials need to avoid making the kind of statements issued frequently 
after September 11 to the effect that terrorists have to be right only once, whereas U.S. 
officials have to be right 100 percent of the time. Such declarations might demonstrate 
firm resolve, but they set an impossible standard; no security regime is foolproof.”209
The logic is simple – the more security there is, the more security will be needed. Not
because enhancing security makes terrorism more likely, but because enormous 
investments in security inevitably raise public expectations and amplify public outrage 
after subsequent failures.
6.3. U.S. Homeland Security: A Long Term Strategy or One President’s 
Agenda?
In the 9/11 Commission Report, it is concluded that after the terrorist attacks of 
9/11, “counterterrorism has become, beyond any doubt the top national security priority 
for the United States.”210 Yet, during the 2008 presidential election campaign the issue 
of homeland security was not a key discussion point. “The presidential transition than 
came and went without the Obama administration publicly outlining its plans for 
homeland security mission.”211 Moreover, in one of her first appearances new Secretary 
of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano altogether omitted the word “terrorism” from 
her prepared testimony before Congress on February 25, 2009.212 Rather, she decided to 
replace it with the term “man-caused disaster”, and later explained that the term 
“terrorism” is a representative of old-fashioned (i.e. Bush administration connected) 
“politics of fear.”213
From the outset, Secretary Napolitano also stressed the civilian management role 
of DHS (e.g., natural disaster recovery, defending infrastructure) more than her two 
predecessors who had focused on preventing terrorist attacks. She has perceived DHS’s 
role as more of an all-hazards organization, rather than a primarily counterterrorist 
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organization. This is consistent with her broad view of fusion centers. The Fusion 
Center Initiative was introduced in 2006 to create “vital assets” that provide the federal 
government with critical information about state and local governments, while the state 
and local governments obtain information about terrorist-related threats.214 Secretary 
Napolitano explained that some fusion centers might focus on a serial killer or gangs 
and not just terrorists. Furthermore, she expressed her view and that the fusion centers 
need to include “capacity for response and recovery” and act as “collaborative space” 
where information can be shared across different disciplines, such as law enforcement, 
fire, public health, emergency management, and critical infrastructure protection, as 
well as the private sector.215
Moreover, President Obama announced in May 2009 an overhaul of the White 
House's brain trust for dealing with 21st century threats, merging the domestic security 
staff with the larger team in charge of all national security issues. The move integrated
the work of the White House's Homeland Security Council within the existing National 
Security Council.216
It thus seems that the Obama administration’s approach changed from that of the 
Bush administration. In this respect, one needs to ask, “if DHS continues to become 
more of an all-hazard organization, how does that broader purpose affects information 
sharing and the priority of gathering intelligence to prevent terrorist attacks?”217
As Gary Schmitt noted in his recent contribution in Weekly Standard, “when it 
comes to homeland security, President Obama’s first year in office was a 
nightmare.”218 In September 2009, Nidal Malik Hasan, a radicalized Army major, 
murdered 13 defense department employees at Ft. Hood, Texas. Shortly thereafter, 
Najibullah Zazi was arrested before he and compatriots were able to carry out an al 
Qaeda-inspired plot to conduct suicide bombings on the New York subway system. 
Then, on Christmas Day, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, at the direction of al Qaeda in 
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the Arabian Peninsula, attempted to kill himself and the 278 passengers aboard a 
transatlantic flight as it approached Detroit. And to top things off, by the year's end, 
nearly four dozen Muslim-Americans had been indicted or arrested in connection with 
terrorist plots originating in the United States or aimed at targets in the U.S.
Both the Hasan case, as well as the Christmas Day bomber case were preceded 
by a number of systemic mistakes caused by the lack of efficient information sharing.219
In the first case, an investigation showed that there was no excuse for the Army to have 
not dealt with Major Hasan well before he went on his killing spree. Peers and superiors 
alike recognized his inability to disassociate his own views from those of Islamists and 
his obsession with issues such as whether Islam forbade American Muslim soldiers 
from taking part in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, FBI's handling of 
the case was also flawed. FBI did not respond to the fact that a Muslim-American U.S. 
military official was in direct email contact with Yemen-based radical islamist cleric 
Anwar al-Awlaki. Second, remarkably, neither of the two FBI Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces (JTTFs) involved in looking at Hasan thought it necessary to alert the 
appropriate counterintelligence offices in the Department of Defense.220
In the second case, again systemic failures across the intelligence community
were discovered. From the State Department failing to revoke Abdulmutallab’s visa, 
placing his name on the “no-fly list”, to connecting and sharing the information within 
the NCTC, none of the policies put in place after 9/11 worked; except for the number of 
alerted passengers, who promptly neutralized the terrorist on board after his 
unsuccessful attempt to detonate a bomb hidden in his underpants.
Thus, even though the Obama administration attempted to shift the 
counterterrorism focus of homeland security to a more all-hazards approach, it was 
quickly reminded of the realities of terrorist threats. In the first months in office, the 
Obama administration’s rhetoric seemed to omit the homeland security agenda as a relic 
of President Bush’s politics of fear but looking at its actual policies it was to continue, 
where the Bush administration left off.
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6.4. Conclusion
Is the unified homeland security a realistic strategy? Looking at the evidence 
presented in chapters 3 through 5, one is tempted to say it is not. Yet, one also has to 
keep in mind the realities in which it was created. The homeland security agenda was 
used by President Bush as a tool of responding to the shock of terrorist attacks of 9/11. 
However, no matter how strong the motivation, the actual implementation lagged and 
was weighed down by the many obstructions discussed in this thesis. The proposal of a 
unified and efficient system did not materialize during the course of two terms of 
President Bush. But we should keep in mind that, as some scholars remind, it took 40 
years for the Department of Defense to gain fully efficient operational capabilities.221
The evidence presented in the previous chapters of this thesis demonstrates that 
both past and current initiatives to create a unified homeland security system and to 
overcome organizational obstacles within the U.S. intelligence community have had 
limited success and are ultimately still a work in progress. If such security lapses are to 
be avoided in the future, the United States government must address the question of 
which policies will ensure the most efficient means of countering terrorist threats.
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Conclusion
The 9/11 attacks forced government officials to quickly reexamine the national 
security policy that had been in place since 1947. U.S. foreign and national security 
policies were based on outdated Cod War realities. Before 9/11, the government was 
still organized according to “stovepipes.” Each sector of government had a discreet and 
defined function National security was handled by the military, as it was not something 
for domestic law enforcement to be involved in. The new asymmetrical warfare, 
typified by the 9/11 attacks, led to the still-continuing effort to change U.S. national 
security policy. The “stovepipes,” the separated agencies – the military, the CIA, the 
FBI, state and local law enforcement – had to dramatically increase their cooperation 
with each other. All these agencies were on the national security frontlines. There had to 
be a new cohesive organization that coordinated and synthesized the information that 
was, before 9/11, being collected by separate agencies – but not shared with each other. 
For this reason, President Bush created first the Office of Homeland Security 
and later proposed the creation of a new cabinet level agency – the Department of 
Homeland Security – by combining twenty-two government agencies with 180,000 
employees. The department’s key role was to serve as the unifying core of the vast 
network involved in homeland security and its main challenge was to develop 
complementary systems to avoid duplication.  Moreover, the Bush administration
stressed that in order to counter the terrorist threat, the collaboration and coordination 
must be increased in intelligence and information sharing, law enforcement and 
prevention, emergency response and recovery, policy development and implementation. 
This effort would allow public and private resources to be aligned to more efficiently 
secure the homeland.
At the beginning of this thesis, two key questions were raised. The first of these 
questions asks whether the proposed homeland security agenda led to an efficient and 
unified system of U.S. domestic counterterrorism measures based on enhanced 
information sharing? The evidence presented in the chapters 3 to 6 suggests that the 
actual steps undertaken in order to achieve the unification of policies responsible for the 
prevention of such events were not sufficiently made, leaving the homeland security 
system hardly unified and efficient.
The second question asked in the introduction of this thesis delved into why, in 
spite of the unique opportunity created by the 9/11 attacks, a comprehensive 
reorganization of the U.S. government to create a coherent homeland security agenda 
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did not materialize? The hypothesis that the adoption of a coherent homeland security 
agenda (which would be both unified and efficient) was obstructed by a number of 
factors proves to be correct. First, the nature of U.S. government agencies involved in 
homeland security hindered extensive reform. Second, the rational choices of the U.S. 
leadership (i.e. the executive and legislative branches of government) did not facilitate a 
process of significant change. Third, the American public’s democratic principles were 
sometimes in conflict with proposals that were seen to undermine civil liberties. 
The main argument presented throughout this diploma thesis is that the original 
aim of reform was to reorganize U.S. government institutions into a single, unified 
enterprise that would be efficient in countering the terrorist threats. This goal has not 
been realized. Although, there has not been another successful terrorist attack within the 
United States like 9/11, the organizational problems within the DHS and its competition 
with the intelligence agencies and Department of Defense have not been overcome.
In order to analyze and evaluate the post-9/11 U.S. government reorganization
and its impact on the efficiency of the proposed homeland security agenda an 
organizational model has been adopted. In this model, it has been argued that 
institutional reform is very difficult due to the bounded rationality of government 
agencies management, informational asymmetry or ‘structural secrecy’ within the
agencies, and the institutional inertia embedded within each agencies’ culture.
Moreover, the intelligence institutions operate in a political and societal 
environment that creates additional constraints on their ability to adapt and reform. 
These external processes consist of executive and legislative decisions made by 
American political leaders who often act in a manner that might be reasonably described 
as being motivated by rational self-interest. Any government reorganization is a very 
sensitive topic for decision makers as it usually involves many complicated and 
unpopular decisions, which can hamper their chances for reelection. In addition, 
American public opinion and its adherence to democratic values based on protection of 
civil liberties has also been an important contextual variable. In general, homeland 
security government reorganization is a very difficult and long term process and this 
situation is not helped by public fears about potential measures that might undermine 
civil liberties. 
Chapter 2 has revealed that throughout the 1990s a number of attempts were 
made to adapt the U.S. national security policy to the changing nature of threats that 
arose after the end of the Cold War. The transnational and asymmetric threats 
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(especially terrorism) superseded the single danger posed by the Soviet Union and its 
satellites. The spectrum of present and potential targets was broadening. A number of 
bipartisan commissions and government studies called for a comprehensive 
counterterrorism strategy and warned (such as the Hart-Rudman Commission) of a 
possible threat of a terrorist attack on the American homeland. Other commissions 
called for a substantial reform of the U.S. intelligence community in order to enhance its 
ability to share information and improve its cooperation. Yet, it seemed that only a 
catastrophe of a 9/11 scope was able to bring about the right incentives for government 
reorganization.
In chapters 3 and 4 it was evidenced based on the analysis of processes behind 
the introduction and promotion of the homeland security agenda that despite the 
momentum for government reorganization the originally proposed homeland security 
policy unifying the U.S. efforts to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks within the 
United States was fulfilled only partially. At the operational level, the difficulties of 
unifying such a vast array of federal agencies provoked constant turf battles among 
powerful bureaucracies. The new focus on homeland security and the difficulties of 
merging twenty-two separate agencies inside the new department inevitably created 
tensions between the agencies’ traditional missions and the overall homeland security 
mission. Moreover, when Congress created the DHS in 2002, it did not transfer to the 
new agency existing government intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Rather, 
Congress sought an analytical office that would use the products from other agencies 
such as the FBI and CIA to provide necessary warning of terrorist attacks; conduct 
vulnerability assessments of key resources and infrastructure; and make 
recommendations for remedial actions at the federal, state, and local levels as well as to 
the private sector. Thus, DHS had neither the power to collect intelligence nor any 
tasking authority over other agencies.
Another aspect of enhancing information sharing within the U.S. government 
was discussed in chapter 4. There, some of the main processes of U.S. intelligence 
community reform were introduced in order to examine the impact of the reform on 
improvement of information and intelligence sharing after 9/11. The implementation of 
the 9/11 Commission recommendations embedded in the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) enacted in 2004 was evaluated. A number of 
problems have been identified regarding the IRTPA. First, the impact of this law was 
diluted during the legislative debate in the U.S. Congress where the Defense 
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Department (DOD) lobby successfully obstructed many changes that would have 
endangered its exclusive position within the intelligence community. Second, the 
IRTPA created new intelligence institutions such as the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI) and the National Counterterrorist Center (NCTC). However, the act 
did not vest enough power allowing them to attain a high level of efficiency. This 
limitation appears to be especially true in the case of the DNI where its position has 
been impaired and its coordination and managerial powers have been hampered. 
Therefore, the DNI is unable to overcome the organizational obstacles to information 
sharing. Third, the organizational obstacles outlined in this study refer primarily to the 
old intelligence agencies, such as the FBI and the CIA, and their resistance to adapt to 
the new security environment by properly implementing the IRTPA provisions. 
Moreover, from the homeland security point of view, it is possible to conclude that 
IRTPA did not substantially strengthen DHS’s own analysis division, it has only fully 
incorporated it in the U.S. intelligence community. But the result has been that the DHS, 
charged with protecting the homeland from terrorist strikes still has to rely on the 
generosity of intelligence gathering agencies, totally outside of its control.
As was argued in chapter 6, creating a fully unified homeland security is a work 
in progress. It takes years for government agencies to create their unique organizational 
culture and accept their mission. In the case of the DHS, this is even a more difficult 
task as the President’s administration is mostly not clear on what exactly the mission 
should be. With the shift of Obama’s administration to the all-hazards approach to 
homeland security, future research should be focused on how this modification will
affect the homeland security’s main institutional problem – coordination and 
information sharing.
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Summary
The argument presented in this thesis may be summarised as follows. The 
introductory chapter outlines the research question addressed in this thesis and the 
research model based on effectiveness and efficiency is introduced.
Chapter 1 provides the theoretical and methodological background for this 
research thesis. This work commences with a definition of homeland security and a 
brief discussion of its role within national security. Thereafter, different theoretical 
approaches to the study of homeland security and their relevance to the post-9/11 
government reorganization are introduced. The organization theory approach to study 
intelligence community is recognized as the most appropriate. Lastly, the Eastonian 
input/output methodology employed in this research thesis is presented.
Chapter 2 focuses on the various aspects of homeland security before 9/11. It 
examines the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism strategy and the changing perceptions 
of possible threats to the U.S. homeland during and after the Cold War. It also analyzes 
the attempts of the U.S. intelligence community to respond to the changed security 
environment in order to improve coordination and information sharing. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to the aftermath of 9/11 and the U.S. government’s 
immediate reaction to the attacks. Shortly after the terrorist attacks President Bush and 
the U.S. Congress promoted two initiatives focused on improving the U.S.’s domestic 
counterterrorism strategy. The first was the enactment of the USA Patriot Act, and the 
second was the proposition of a comprehensive homeland security agenda.
Chapter 4 delves into the legislative, executive and organizational processes 
connected with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. It also evaluates 
the DHS’s role in information sharing and intelligence coordination.
Chapter 5 analyzes the various aspects of U.S. intelligence community reform 
undertaken in order to enhance information sharing. It delves into the implementation of 
the 9/11 Commission recommendations through the adoption of the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). Then, the implementation of the IRTPA 
provisions is evaluated based on an analysis of the newly created institutions and their 
role in the intelligence community structure, and also of the old institutions and their 
attempts for internal change.
Chapter 6 provides an answer asked in the title of this thesis whether homeland 
security is a reality or myth and evaluates the concept of unified homeland security 
agenda with regards to the transition of the Bush and Obama presidencies.
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In the concluding chapter, the two research questions are answered and the main 
arguments of this diploma thesis are summarized. 
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Department 
of Homeland 
Security 
(DHS)
Undersecretary for 
Management
Citizenship & 
Immigration Services 
(CIS)
Coast Guard 
(USCG)
Secret Service (USSS)
Border and 
Transport 
Security (BTS)
Emergency 
Preparedness & 
Response 
(EP&R)
Information 
Analysis & 
Infrastructure 
Protection (IAIP)
Science & 
Technology (S&T)
Customs and 
Border Protection 
(CBP)
Federal Emergency 
Management 
Agency (FEMA)
Infrastructure 
Protection
Homeland Security 
Advanced Research 
Projects Agency 
(HSARPA)
Immigration and 
Customs 
Enforcement (ICE)
Information Analysis 
(IA)
Transport Security 
Administration 
(TSA)
Office of Domestic 
Preparedness 
(ODP)
Source: Hornbarger, Chris, p.291 and Haynes, Wendy, p. 370.
Customs Service 
(Treasury)
Transportation 
Security 
Administration 
(Transportation)
Federal Protective 
Service (General 
Services 
Administration)  
Federal Law 
Enforcement Training 
Center (Treasury)
Office of Domestic 
Preparedness (Justice)
 Immigration and 
Naturalization Service 
(Justice)
Federal Emergency 
Management Agency
 Integrated Hazard 
Information System
National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric 
Administration
National Domestic 
Preparedness Office 
(FBI)
Domestic Emergency 
Support Teams (Justice)
Emergency 
preparedness, national
disaster, and medical 
response systems 
(Health)
 Strategic National 
Stockpile (Health)
National 
Infrastructure 
Protection Center 
(FBI)
National 
Communications 
System (Defense)
Critical Infrastructure 
Assurance Office 
(Commerce)
National 
Infrastructure 
Simulation and 
Analysis Center 
(Energy)
Federal Computer 
Incident  Response 
Center (General 
Services 
Administration)  
National Bio-weapons 
Defense Analysis 
Center (Defense)
Plum Island Animal 
Disease Center 
(Agriculture)
Chemical and biological 
national security 
nonproliferation 
program, nuclear 
proliferation programs, 
and nuclear assessment 
programs (Energy)
Environmental 
Measurements 
Laboratory (Energy)
Advanced scientific 
computing research 
programs and activities 
(Energy)
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Appendix 4: List of Abbreviations
2SR Second Stage Review, Revize druhého stupně
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CTC Counterterrorism Center
DCI Director of Central Intelligence
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
DNI Director of National Intelligence
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy
DOT Department of Transportation
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
FY Fiscal Year
HSC Homeland Security Council
HUMINT Human Intelligence
IAIP Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
I&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis
IC21 Intelligence Community in the 21st Century Committee
IMINT Imagery Intelligence
INS Immigration and Naturalization Service
NCPC National Counter Proliferation Center
NCTC National Counterterrorism Center
NFIP National Foreign Intelligence Program
NGA National Geospatial Agency
NIC National Intelligence Council
NIE National Intelligence Estimate
NIP National Intelligence Program
NRO National Reconnaissance Office 
NSA National Security Agency
IRTPA Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
JMIP Joint Military Intelligence Program
JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force
ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OHS Office of Homeland Security
PDB Presidential Daily Brief
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
TIARA Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
TSA Transport Security Administration
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WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
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bezpečnosti k centrálnímu shromáždění, analýze a dalšímu šíření, se postavily proti a 
raději začaly samy vytvářet své protiteroristické aktivity zabývající se zajišťováním 
vnitřní bezpečnosti.
Cíle diplomové práce:
Cílem mé práce bude analýza událostí, které vedly k vytvoření DHS a dále 
provázely tento složitý proces. Analyzována bude také navazující reforma 
zpravodajských složek. Hlavní pozornost bude věnována problematickým aspektům 
těchto reforem z hlediska sjednocování protiteroristických politik administrativou 
presidenta G.W. Bushe. 
Výzkumná otázka:
Základní otázkou práce bude proč i přes snahy administrativy presidenta G.W. 
Bushe nedošlo za celou dobu jeho prezidentského období k vytvoření plánovaného 
jednotného systému vnitřní bezpečnosti. Jako navazující otázka se pak nabízí, zda je 
takovýto systém možné v současném americkém politickém systému vytvořit a zda je 
sjednocení zpravodajských služeb z hlediska protiteroristické strategie USA opravdu 
žádoucí.
Předběžná hypotéza:
Fakt, že k vytvoření jednotného systému zcela nedošlo, dosud neznamenal 
fatální ohrožení vnitřní bezpečnosti Spojených států amerických. Je proto možné
předpokládat, že centralizování zpravodajských služeb a ostatních agentur vnitřní 
bezpečnosti není pro zajištění bezpečnosti USA nezbytně nutné.
Předpokládná metoda zpracování tématu:
Hlavní metodou práce bude aplikace neoliberální institucionální teorie motivů a 
procesů vytváření politických institucí na proces založení DHS a dále na institucionální 
reformu amerických zpravodajských složek. 
Na jedné straně se zaměřím na analýzu oficiálních dokumentů (zákonů, vládních 
vyhlášek, prohlášení a analýz) a na straně druhé budu čerpat z novinových komentářů a 
analýz věnujících se dané problematice, a také z odborných prací na dané téma 
(publikace, články v odborných časopisech, atd.).
Předpokládaná osnova práce
1. Úvod
2. Vnitřní bezpečnost a zpravodajské složky před 11. zářím 2001
3. 11. září 2001 a selhání zpravodajských služeb
4. Reorganizace vnitřní bezpečnosti po 11. září – Ministerstvo pro vnitřní 
bezpečnost
5. Reforma zpravodajských složek
6. Hlavní problematické aspekty
7. Závěr
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